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Summary
Operation Iraqi Freedom succeeded in overthrowing Saddam Hussein, but
replacing his regime with a stable, moderate, democratic political structure has been
complicated by Sunni Arab resentment and a related insurgency.  The Bush
Administration says that U.S. forces will remain in Iraq until the stated mission is
complete:  the establishment of a stable democracy that will not host radical Islamist
forces and would serve as a model for democratic reform throughout the Middle East.
However, a growing number of accounts suggest that mounting casualties and costs
might cause the Administration to wind down the U.S. involvement without
completely accomplishing those goals.
The Bush Administration asserts that U.S. policy in Iraq is  showing important
successes, demonstrated by elections that chose a National Assembly (January 30,
2005), the referendum on the permanent constitution (October 15, 2005), progress
in building Iraq’s various security forces, and economic growth.  The next major
milestone will be the holding of  elections for a permanent government by December
15, 2005.  The Administration has been working with the new Iraqi government to
include more Sunni Arabs in the power structure; Sunnis, many of whom are
mobilizing to vote against the draft constitution, were dominant during the regime
of Saddam Hussein and now feel marginalized by the newly dominant Shiite Arabs
and Kurds.  The Administration believes that it has largely healed a rift with some
European countries over the decision to invade Iraq, and it points to NATO and other
nations’ contributions of training for Iraqi security forces and government personnel.
Others believe the U.S. mission in Iraq is failing and that major new policy
initiatives are required.  Some believe that U.S. counter-insurgent operations are
hampered by an insufficient U.S. troop commitment.  Others believe that a U.S.
move toward withdrawal might undercut popular support for the insurgency without
undermining U.S. security.  A further complication to U.S. policy is the recent or
imminent withdrawal of sizeable allied troop commitments, although the Iraqi
security forces (ISF) are growing and many contributing nations are compensating
for their withdrawals with trainers for the ISF.  
This report will be updated as warranted by major developments. See also CRS
Report RS21968, Iraq: Elections, Government, and Constitution, by Kenneth
Katzman; CRS Report RS22079, The Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq, by Kenneth
Katzman and Alfred Prados; CRS Report RL32105, Post-War Iraq: Foreign
Contributions to Training, Peacekeeping, and Reconstruction, by Jeremy Sharp and
Christopher Blanchard; and CRS Report RL31833, Iraq: Recent Developments in
Reconstruction Assistance, by Curt Tarnoff.
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Iraq:  U.S. Regime Change Efforts and 
Post-Saddam Governance
The United States did not remove Iraq’s Saddam Hussein from power in the
course of the 1991 Persian Gulf war, and his regime survived post-war uprisings by
Iraq’s Shiites and Kurds.  For twelve years after that, the United States provided
some support to dissidents inside Iraq, although changing Iraq’s regime did not
become U.S. declared policy until November 1998, after repeated crises over access
to Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) facilities.
Iraq has previously had experience with a democratic form of government,
although parliamentary elections were held during the period of British rule under a
League of Nations mandate (from 1920 until Iraq’s independence in 1932), and the
monarchy of the (Sunni Muslim) Hashemite dynasty (1921-1958).1  Previously, Iraq
had been a province of the Ottoman empire until British forces defeated the
Ottomans and took control of what is now Iraq in 1918.  Iraq’s first Hashemite king
was Faysal bin Hussein, son of Sharif Hussein of Mecca who, advised by British
officer T.E Lawrence (“Lawrence of Arabia”), led the Arab revolt against the
Ottoman Empire during World War I.  Faysal ruled Iraq as King Faysal I and was
succeeded by his son, Ghazi (1933-1939).  Ghazi was succeeded by his son, Faysal
II, who ruled until the military coup of Abd al-Karim al-Qasim on July 14, 1958.
Qasim was ousted in February 1963 by a Baath Party - military alliance.  Also in
1963, the Baath Party took power in Syria.  It still rules there today, although there
was rivalry between the Syrian and Iraqi Baath regimes during Saddam’s rule.
One of the Baath Party’s allies in the February 1963 coup in Iraq was Abd al-
Salam al-Arif.  In November 1963, Arif purged the Baath, including Baathist Prime
Minister (and military officer) Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, and instituted direct military
rule.  Arif was killed in a helicopter crash in 1966 and was replaced by his elder
brother, Abd al-Rahim al-Arif, who ruled until the Baath Party coup of July 1968.
Following the Baath seizure, Bakr returned to government as President of Iraq and
Saddam Hussein, a civilian, became the second most powerful leader as Vice
Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council.  In that position, Saddam
developed overlapping security services to monitor loyalty among the population and
within Iraq’s institutions, including the military.  On July 17, 1979, the aging al-Bakr
resigned at Saddam’s urging, and Saddam became President of Iraq.  Saddam’s
regime became particularly repressive of Iraq’s Shiites after the 1979 Islamic
revolution in neighboring Iran, which activated and emboldened Iraqi Shiite Islamist
movements that wanted to establish an Iranian-style Islamic republic of Iraq.
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Anti-Saddam Groups and U.S. Policy
The major factions that now dominate post-Saddam Iraq had been active against
Saddam Hussein for decades, receiving some U.S. support after the 1991 Gulf war.
Prior to the launching on January 16, 1991, of Operation Desert Storm, which
reversed Iraq’s August 1990 invasion of Kuwait, President George H.W. Bush called
on the Iraqi people to overthrow Saddam.  That Administration decided not to
militarily  overthrow Saddam Hussein in the course of the 1991 war because the
United Nations had approved only the liberation of Kuwait, because the Arab states
in the coalition opposed an advance to Baghdad, and because it feared becoming
bogged down in a high-casualty occupation.2  Within days of the  war’s end
(February 28, 1991), Shiite Muslims in southern Iraq and Kurdish factions in
northern Iraq, emboldened by the regime’s defeat and the hope of U.S. support,
launched significant rebellions.  The Shiite revolt nearly reached Baghdad,  but the
loyal, mostly Sunni Muslim Republican Guard forces had survived the war largely
intact  and they suppressed the rebels.  Many Iraqi Shiites blamed the United States
for not preventing regime retaliation against the rebels.  Iraq’s Kurds, benefitting
from a U.S.-led “no fly zone” set up in April 1991, drove Iraqi troops out of much
of northern Iraq and remained autonomous thereafter.
About two months after the failure of these uprisings, President George H.W.
Bush reportedly sent Congress an intelligence finding that the United States would
try to promote a military coup against Saddam Hussein.  The Administration
apparently believed that a coup by elements within the regime could produce a
favorable government without fragmenting Iraq, an unwanted outcome that many
observers feared would result from a Shiite and Kurdish-led ouster of  Saddam.
After a reported July 1992 coup failed, there was a U.S. decision to shift to
supporting the Kurdish, Shiite, and other oppositionists that were coalescing into a
broad and diverse movement.3  The following sections discuss the organizations and
personalities that dominate post-Saddam governance; most of them have carried over
their own militias into the post-Saddam period.
Iraqi  National Congress (INC)/Ahmad Chalabi.  After 1991, the exiled
opposition groups coalesced into “the Iraqi National Congress (INC),” which was
constituted in 1992 when the two main Kurdish parties and several major Shiite
Islamist groups agreed to join it and adopt its platform of  human rights, democracy,
pluralism, “federalism” (Kurdish autonomy), the preservation of Iraq’s territorial
integrity, and compliance with U.N. Security Council resolutions on Iraq.4  However,
many observers doubted its commitment to democracy, because most of its groups
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have authoritarian leaderships.  The Kurds provided it with some armed force and a
presence on Iraqi territory.
When the INC was formed, its Executive Committee selected Chalabi, a secular
Shiite Muslim from a prominent banking family, to run the INC on a daily basis.
Chalabi, who is about 61 years old, was educated in the United States (Massachusetts
Institute of Technology) as a mathematician.  His father was president of the Senate
in the monarchy that was overthrown in the 1958 military coup, and the family fled
to Jordan.  He taught math at the American University of Beirut in 1977 and, in 1978,
he founded the Petra Bank in Jordan.  He later ran afoul of Jordanian authorities on
charges of embezzlement and he left Jordan, possibly with some help from members
of Jordan’s royal family, in 1989.5  Chalabi maintains that the Jordanian government
was pressured by Iraq to turn against him.  In April 2003, Jordan’s King Abdullah II
publicly called Chalabi “divisive,” although in May 2005 the King agreed to consider
a pardon in exchange for restitution. 
The INC and Chalabi have been controversial in the United States since the INC
was formed.  The State Department and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reportedly
believed the INC had little popularity inside Iraq.  However, in the George W. Bush
Administration, numerous press reports indicated that the Defense Department and
office of Vice President Cheney believed the INC was well positioned to lead a post-
Saddam regime.  Chalabi’s supporters maintain that it was largely his determination
that has now led to the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.  
After the start of the 2003 war, Chalabi and about 700 INC fighters (“Free Iraqi
Forces”) were airlifted by the U.S. military from their base in the north to the
Nasiriya area, purportedly to help stabilize civil affairs in southern Iraq.  After
establishing a headquarters in Baghdad, Chalabi tried to build support by directing
U.S. forces to possible hideouts of  members of the former regime.  Chalabi’s  Free
Iraqi Forces were disbanded following the U.S. decision in mid-May 2003 to disarm
independent militias.
As an Iraqi governance structure was established, Chalabi was selected to the
Iraq Governing Council (IGC) and he was one of its nine rotating presidents
(president during September 2003).  He headed the IGC’s committee on “de-
Baathification,” although his vigilance in purging former Baathists was slowed by
U.S. officials in  early 2004.  Since 2004, Chalabi  has allied with Shiite Islamist
factions; he was number 10 on Ayatollah Sistani’s “United Iraqi Alliance” slate for
the January 30, 2005 elections.  He is now one of three deputy prime ministers, with
a focus on economic and legal issues (trial of former regime members), and he is still
pressing aggressive de-Baathification. 
Chalabi’s new prominence completes his comeback from a 2003-2004 fallout
with Washington, demonstrated when U.S.-backed Iraqi police raided INC
headquarters in Baghdad on May 20, 2004, seizing computers and files that the INC
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had captured from various Iraqi ministries after Saddam’s fall.  They were reportedly
investigating various allegations, including that Chalabi had provided intelligence to
Iran.6  In August 2004, an Iraqi judge issued a warrant for Chalabi’s arrest on
counterfeiting charges, and for his nephew Salem Chalabi’s arrest for the murder of
an Iraqi finance ministry official.  (Salem had headed the tribunal trying Saddam
Hussein and his associates.)  The case was subsequently dropped.  Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard  Meyers said on May 20, 2004, that the INC
had provided some information that had saved the lives of U.S. soldiers.  (A table on
U.S. appropriations for the Iraqi opposition, including the INC, is an appendix).
Iraq National Accord (INA)/Iyad al-Allawi.  The Iraq National Accord
(INA), founded after Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait, was supported initially by
Saudi Arabia but later, according to press reports, by the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA).7  Consisting of defectors from Iraq’s Baath Party and security organs who had
ties to disgruntled sitting officials in those organizations, the INA has been headed
since 1990 by Dr. Iyad al-Allawi who that year broke with another INA leader, Salah
Umar al-Tikriti.  Allawi is a former Baathist who, according to some reports, helped
Saddam Hussein silence Iraqi dissidents in Europe in the mid-1970s.8  Allawi, who
is about 59 years old (born 1946 in Baghdad), fell out with Saddam in the mid-1970s,
became a neurologist and presided over  the Iraqi Student Union in Europe.  He
survived an assassination attempt in London in 1978, allegedly by Iraq’s agents.  He
is a secular Shiite Muslim, but many INA members are Sunnis.  Allawi no longer
considers himself a Baath Party member, but he has not openly denounced the
original tenets of Baathism, a pan-Arab multi-ethnic movement founded in the 1940s
by Lebanese Christian philosopher Michel Aflaq.
In 1996, the fractiousness among anti-Saddam groups caused the Clinton
Administration to shift support to Iyad al-Allawi’s INA.9  An opportunity presented
itself when Saddam’s son-in-law Hussein Kamil al-Majid (organizer of Iraq’s
weapons of mass destruction efforts) defected to Jordan in August 1995, setting off
turmoil within Saddam’s regime.  Jordan’s King Hussein subsequently allowed the
INA to operate from Jordan.  However, the INA proved penetrated by Iraq’s
intelligence services and Baghdad arrested or executed over 100 INA activists  in
June 1996.  In August 1996, Baghdad launched a military incursion into northern
Iraq, at the invitation of the KDP, to help it capture Irbil from the PUK.  The
incursion enabled Baghdad to also rout remaining INC and INA operatives
throughout the north, executing two hundred oppositionists and arresting 2,000
others.  The United States evacuated from northern Iraq and eventually resettled in
the United States 650 mostly INC activists.
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In post-Saddam Iraq, Allawi was named to the IGC and to its rotating
presidency (president during October 2003).  He was interim prime minister during
June 2004-January 2005, but his INA-led candidate slate (The Iraqis List) in the
January 30 elections garnered about 14% of the vote, giving his bloc 40 of the 275
seats.  Neither he nor any other INA figure was given a cabinet or other senior
position in the new government.  He is planning a come-back try in the December
2005 national elections and in October 2005 announced a new secular coalition.
Major Kurdish Organizations/KDP and PUK.10  The Kurds, who are
mostly Sunni Muslims but are not Arabs, and who are probably the most pro-U.S. of
all the major groups, have a historic fear of persecution by the Arab majority and
want to preserve the autonomy of the post-1991 Gulf war period.  A major question
is whether the Kurds might seek outright independence and try to unify with Kurds
in neighboring countries into a broader “Kurdistan.”  The two main Kurdish factions
are the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) led by Jalal Talabani  and the Kurdistan
Democratic Party (KDP), led by Masud Barzani.  Together, they claim to have about
100,000 peshmergas (fighters), most of whom are now operating as  unofficial
security organs in northern Iraqi cities, while some are integrated into the new
national security forces and deployed in such cities as  Mosul and Baghdad.
In May 1994, the KDP and the PUK clashed with each other over territory,
customs revenues, and control over the Kurdish regional government in Irbil.  The
infighting contributed to the defeat of an INC offensive against Iraqi troops in March
1995 when the KDP pulled out of the offensive at the last minute.  The offensive
initially overran some  front-line Iraqi units.  
The Kurdish parties insisted on retaining substantial Kurdish autonomy in
northern Iraq in post-Saddam Iraq.  Talabani was IGC president in November 2003,
and Barzani led it in April 2004.  The two factions  offered a joint slate in the January
30 elections, which won about 26% of the vote and gained 75 seats in the new
Assembly.  A separate moderate Islamist Kurdish slate (Kurdistan Islamic Group)
won two seats.  Talabani has now become president;  Hoshyar Zibari (KDP) and
Barham Salih (PUK) are ministers; and Rowsch Shaways is a deputy Prime Minister.
On the other hand, there are said to be growing strains between the KDP and PUK;
on June 12, 2005, the 111-seat Kurdish regional assembly (also elected on January
30, 2005) named Masud Barzani “president of Kurdistan,” suggesting Barzani is
focused on solidifying his base in northern Iraq.  On the other hand, Barzani did
participate extensively in the final negotiations on the new Iraqi constitution.
Shiite Islamist Leaders and Organizations: Ayatollah Sistani, SCIRI,
Da’wa Party, Moqtada al-Sadr, and Others.  Shiite Islamist organizations are
emerging as the strongest factors in post-Saddam politics.  Shiite Muslims constitute
about 60% of the population but were under-represented in every Iraqi government.
Several factions cooperated with the U.S. regime change efforts of the 1990s, but
others had no contact with the United States at all.  In an event that many Iraqi Shiites
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still refer to as an example of their potential to frustrate great power influence, Shiite
Muslims led a major  revolt against British occupation forces in 1921.  
Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani/United Iraqi Alliance (UIA).  Grand
Ayatollah Sistani was mostly silent during Saddam Hussein’s regime and was not
part of U.S.-backed regime change efforts in the 1990s.  As the “marja-e-taqlid”
(source of emulation) and the most senior of the four Shiite clerics that lead the
Najaf-based “Hawza al-Ilmiyah” (a grouping of seminaries), he is a major political
force in post-Saddam politics.11  Sistani also has a network of supporters and agents
(wakils) throughout Iraq and in countries where there are large Shiite communities.
Sistani is about 77 years old and suffers from heart problems that required treatment
in the United Kingdom in August 2004.  Sistani was instrumental in putting together
the united slate of Shiite Islamist movements in the January 30 elections (“United
Iraqi Alliance,” UIA).  The slate received about 48% of the vote and  has 140 seats
in the new Assembly, just enough for a majority of the 275-seat body.
Sistani was born in Iran and studied in Qom, Iran, before relocating to Najaf at
the age of 21.  He became head of the Hawza when his mentor, Ayatollah Abol
Qasem Musavi-Khoi, died in 1992.  Sistani generally opposes a direct role for clerics
in government, but he believes in clerical guidance and supervision of political
leaders, partly explaining his deep involvement in shaping political outcomes  in
post-Saddam Iraq.  He wants Iraq to maintain its Islamic culture and not to become
secular and Westernized, favoring modest dress for women and curbs on alcohol
consumption and Western-style music and entertainment.12  On the other hand, his
career does not suggest that he favors a repressive regime and he does not have a
record of supporting militant Shiite organizations such as Lebanese Hizbollah.  
Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI).  SCIRI
is the largest single party within the UIA and the  best organized Shiite Islamist party.
It is also the most pro-Iranian:  it was set up in Iran in 1982, mainly by ex-Da’wa
Party members (see below), to increase Iranian control over Shiite movements in Iraq
and the Persian Gulf states.  At its founding, SCIRI’s  leader, Ayatollah Mohammad
Baqr al-Hakim, was designated by the late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini of Iran to
head an Islamic republic of Iraq if Saddam were ousted.  During Khomeini’s exile
in Najaf (1964-1978), he  enjoyed the protection of  Mohammad Baqr’s father, Grand
Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim, who was then head of the Hawza. 
SCIRI founders were in exile in Iran after a major crackdown in 1980 by
Saddam,  who accused pro-Khomeini Iraqi Shiite Islamists of trying to overthrow
him.  Although it  was a member of the INC in the early 1990s, SCIRI refused to
accept U.S. funds, although it did have contacts with the United States during this
period.  SCIRI leaders say they do not seek to establish an Iranian-style Islamic
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republic, but SCIRI reportedly receives substantial amounts of financial and in-kind
assistance from Iran.  SCIRI also runs a television station.  
 Mohammad Baqr was  killed in a car bombing in August 2003 in Najaf, and
his younger brother, Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, a lower ranking Shiite cleric, is its
leader.  Hakim served on the IGC (he was IGC president during December 2003).
He  was  number one on the UIA slate, making him a major force in negotiations
over the post-election government.  His key aide is Adel Abd al-Mahdi, who was
Finance Minister in Allawi’s interim government and is now a deputy president.  
SCIRI’s “Badr Brigades”.  As discussed further below,  U.S. officials express
concern about  SCIRI’s continued fielding of the Badr Brigades militia (now renamed
the “Badr Organization”), which number about 20,000 and are playing  unofficial
policing roles in Basra and other Shiite  cities.  Some Badr members have joined the
national Iraqi police and military forces, although they retain their loyalties to Badr
and SCIRI.  The Badr Brigades were formed, trained, and equipped by Iran’s
Revolutionary Guard, politically aligned with Iran’s hardliners, during the Iran-Iraq
war, during which Badr guerrillas conducted forays from Iran into southern Iraq to
attack Baath Party officials.  Most Badr fighters were recruited from the ranks of
Iraqi prisoners of war held in Iran.  However, many Iraqi Shiites viewed SCIRI as an
Iranian puppet, and Badr operations in southern Iraq during the 1980s and 1990s did
not spark broad popular unrest against the Iraqi regime.  The Badr Organization, led
by Hadi al-Amiri, registered as a separate political entity, in addition to its SCIRI
parent, for the January 30 election.  Some Sunnis have accused Badr fighters of
conducting retaliatory attacks on Sunnis suspected of links to the insurgency.  (A
related militia, called the “Wolf Brigade” is a Badr offshoot that is formally under the
Ministry of Interior’s control.  It is led by a SCIRI activist).  
  
Da’wa Party/Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jafari.  The second of the most
prominent UIA parties, the Da’wa (Islamic Call) Party is Iraq’s oldest Shiite Islamist
faction.  Da’wa was founded in 1957 by a revered Iraqi Shiite cleric, Ayatollah
Mohammed Baqr Al Sadr, an uncle of Moqtada al-Sadr and a peer of Ayatollah
Khomeini.  Da’wa was the most  active Shiite opposition movement in the few years
following Iran’s Islamic revolution in February 1979; its  activists conducted guerrilla
attacks against the Baathist regime and attempted assassinations of senior Iraqi
leaders, including Tariq Aziz.  Ayatollah Baqr Al Sadr was hung by the Iraqi regime
in 1980 for the unrest, and many other Da’wa activists were killed or imprisoned.
Most of the surviving members  moved into Iran; some subsequently joined SCIRI,
but others rejected Iranian control of Iraq’s Shiite groups and continued to affiliate
only with Da’wa.  Unlike SCIRI, Da’wa does not have an organized militia, and it
has a lower proportion of  clerics than does SCIRI.13 
Ibrahim al-Jafari, now Prime Minister, is about 55 years old (born in 1950 in
Karbala).  He has been a Da’wa activist since 1966.  He attended medical school in
Mosul and fled to Iran in 1980 to escape Saddam’s crackdown on the Da’wa.  He
later went to live in London, possibly because he did not want to be seen as too
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16 Khoi had headed the Khoi Foundation, based in London.
closely linked to Iran.  During the 1990s, Da’wa did not join the U.S. effort to
overthrow Saddam Hussein.  Jafari previously served on the IGC;14 he was the first
of the nine rotating IGC  presidents (August 2003).  He was deputy president in
Allawi’s interim government.  He was number 7 on the UIA slate and, on April 7, he
became prime minister.  The new minister of state for national security, Abd al-
Karim al-Anzi, is a member of a Da’wa faction.  Jafari’s spokesman is Laith Kubba,
previously a staffer with the Washington-based National Endowment for Democracy.
Da’wa has a checkered history in the region, although there is no public
evidence that Jafari was involved in any  terrorist  activity.  The Kuwaiti branch of
the Da’wa Party allegedly was responsible for a May 1985 attempted assassination
of the Amir of Kuwait and the December 1983 attacks on the U.S. and French
embassies in Kuwait.  Lebanese Hizballah was founded by Lebanese clerics loyal to
Baqr Al Sadr and Khomeini, and there continue to be personal and ideological
linkages between Hizballah and Da’wa (as well as with SCIRI).  The Hizballah
activists who  held U.S. hostages in that country during the 1980s often attempted to
link release of the Americans to the release of 17 Da’wa prisoners held by Kuwait for
those attacks in the 1980s.  Some Da’wa members in Iraq are guided by Lebanon’s
Shiite cleric Mohammed Hossein Fadlallah, who was a student of Baqr Al Sadr.
Moqtada al-Sadr/Mahdi Army.  Relatives of Ayatollah Baqr Al Sadr are
highly active in  post-Saddam Iraq, but not as part of the Da’wa Party.15  The Sadr
clan stayed in Iraq during Saddam Hussein’s rule, and it was repressed politically
during that time.  The most politically active of the clan now is Moqtada Al Sadr,
who is about 31 years old (born in 1974), is the lone surviving son of the revered
Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr.  The Ayatollah was killed, along with  his other
two sons, by regime security forces in 1999 after he began agitating against
Saddam’s government.  Sadr is viewed by Ayatollah Sistani, SCIRI, and Da’wa as
a young radical who lacks religious and political weight.  This view took hold on
April 10, 2003, when his supporters allegedly stabbed to death Abd al-Majid Khoi,
the son of the late Grand Ayatollah Khoi, shortly after Khoi’s U.S.-backed arrival in
Iraq.16  To counter  criticism, Moqtada has sought spiritual authority for his actions
from his mentor, Ayatollah Kazem Haeri, who lives in Qom, Iran.  There is also a
personal dimension to the Sistani-Sadr rift; Sadr’s father had been a rival of Sistani
for pre-eminent Shiite religious authority in Iraq.
Moqtada al-Sadr has used his father’s legacy to emerge as a formidable figure,
apparently calculating that U.S. policy will not produce stability and that he might
later rally his supporters against the reigning post-Saddam establishment.  Moqtada
has retained his father’s political base in the Baghdad district now called “Sadr City,”
which has a population of about 2 million mostly poorer Shiites, making Moqtada
a significant Shiite force in post-Saddam Iraq.  Moqtada has played to his base by
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adopting hard-line positions against the U.S. presence.  At first, Sadr used Friday
prayer sermons in Kufa (near Najaf), published anti-U.S. newspapers, and instigated
demonstrations to paint Iraqi officials as puppets of the U.S. occupation and to call
for a U.S. withdrawal.  He did not seek to join the IGC or the interim government.
Despite U.S. and Sistani overtures for Sadr to participate in the January 30,
2005, elections on the UIA slate, Sadr came out publicly against the elections,
claiming they did not address the real needs of the Iraqi people for economic
opportunity.  However, suggesting that Sadr wants the option of participating in the
political process in the future, about ten of his supporters  won National Assembly
seats running on the UIA slate, and three others won seats under the separate pro-
Sadr “Nationalist Elites and Cadres List.”  Pro-Sadr candidates also won pluralities
in several southern Iraqi provincial council elections and hold 6 seats on Basra’s 41-
seat provincial council.  It is reported that three ministers in the new government,
including  minister of transportation Salam al-Maliki, are Sadr supporters.
Mahdi Army Militia.  In mid-2003, Sadr began recruiting a militia (the “Mahdi
Army”) to combat the U.S. occupation.  U.S. military operations put down Mahdi
Army uprisings in April 2004 and August 2004 in Sadr City, Najaf, and other Shiite
cities.  In each case, fighting was ended with compromises with Sadr under which
Mahdi forces stopped fighting (and in some cases traded in some of their weapons
for money) in exchange for lenient treatment or releases of prisoners, amnesty for
Sadr himself, and reconstruction aid.  U.S. operations were assisted by
pronouncements and diplomacy by Sistani opposing Sadr’s challenges.  The Mahdi
Army has since ended active anti-U.S. activity, and Sadr City has been relatively
quiet, but Mahdi fighters continue to patrol that district and parts of other Shiite
cities.  Mahdi members are said to be increasingly strong in Basra, where they have
sought to enforce personal behavior that conforms to Islam and tradition.  Mahdi (and
Badr Brigade) assertiveness in Basra has  partly accounted for a sharp deterioration
of relations since July 2005 between Iraqi officials in Basra and the British forces that
conduct peacekeeping in the city.  About eight British soldiers have died in attacks
in that area since that time, and in October 2005, British Prime Minister Tony Blair
publicly blamed Iran for arming Iraqi groups responsible for the soldiers’ deaths.  In
one dispute, British forces forcibly rescued British special forces soldiers taken into
official custody in Basra.  
Other Shiite Organizations and Militias.  A smaller Shiite Islamist
organization, the Islamic Amal (Action) Organization, is headed by Ayatollah
Mohammed Taqi Modarassi, a relatively moderate Shiite cleric who returned from
exile in Iran after Saddam fell.  Islamic Amal’s power base is in Karbala, and,
operating under the SCIRI umbrella, it conducted attacks there against  regime organs
in the 1980s.  Islamic Amal does not appear to have a following nearly as large as do
SCIRI or Da’wa.  Modarassi’s brother, Abd al-Hadi, headed the Islamic Front for the
Liberation of Bahrain, which stirred Shiite unrest against Bahrain’s regime in the
1980s and 1990s.  Islamic Amal won two seats in the January 30 election.  Another
Shiite grouping, called Fadilah, is part of the UIA coalition.  Loyal to Ayatollah
Mohammad Yacoubi, it is a splinter group of Moqtada al-Sadr’s faction and is
perceived as somewhat more hardline (anti-U.S. presence) than SCIRI or Da’wa.  It
holds some seats on several provincial councils in the Shiite provinces.  
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A variety of press reports say that some other Shiite militias are operating in
southern Iraq.  One such militia is derived from the fighters who challenged Saddam
Hussein’s forces in the southern marsh areas, around the town of Amara, north of
Basra.  It goes by the name Hizbollah-Iraq and it is headed by guerrilla leader Abdul
Karim Muhammadawi, who was on the IGC.  Hizbollah-Iraq apparently  plays a
major role in policing Amara and environs. 
Clinton Administration “Regime Change” Strategy/Iraq Liberation
Act.  Several of the groups discussed above were beneficiaries of U.S. efforts in the
late 1990s to oust Saddam Hussein.  During 1996-1998,  the Clinton Administration
had little contact with the opposition, believing it to be too fragmented and weak to
topple Saddam.  During 1997-1998, Iraq’s obstructions of U.N. weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) inspections led to growing congressional calls to overthrow
Saddam, although virtually no one was advocating a U.S.-led military invasion to
accomplish that.  A congressional push for a regime change policy began with an
FY1998 supplemental appropriations (P.L. 105-174) and continuing with
appropriations in subsequent years, as shown in the appendix.  
A clear indication of congressional support for a more active U.S. overthrow
effort was encapsulated in another bill introduced in 1998:  the Iraq Liberation Act
(ILA, P.L. 105-338, October 31, 1998).  The ILA was widely interpreted as an
expression of congressional support for the concept, advocated by Chalabi and some
U.S. experts, of  promoting an Iraqi insurgency using U.S. air-power.  President
Clinton signed the legislation, despite doubts about opposition capabilities.  The ILA:
! stated that it should be the policy of the United States to “support
efforts” to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein.  In mid-
November 1998, President Clinton publicly articulated that regime
change was a component of U.S. policy toward Iraq.  
! gave the President authority to provide up to $97 million worth of
defense articles and services, as well as $2 million in broadcasting
funds, to opposition groups designated by the Administration.  
! did not specifically provide for its termination after Saddam Hussein
is removed from power.  Section 7 of the ILA provides for
continuing post-Saddam “transition assistance” to Iraqi parties and
movements with “democratic goals.” 
The signing of the ILA coincided with  new crises over Iraq’s obstructions of
U.N. weapons inspections.  On December 15, 1998, U.N. inspectors were withdrawn,
and a three-day U.S. and British bombing campaign against suspected Iraqi WMD
facilities followed  (Operation Desert Fox, December 16-19, 1998).  On February 5,
1999, President Clinton issued a determination (P.D. 99-13) making seven opposition
groups eligible to receive U.S. military assistance under the act:  INC; INA; SCIRI;
KDP; PUK; the Islamic Movement of Iraqi Kurdistan (IMIK);17 and the Movement
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did not receive U.S. funds after 2001, although it was not formally taken off the ILA
eligibility list.
18 In concert with a May 1999 INC visit to Washington D.C, the Clinton Administration
announced a draw down of  $5 million worth of training and “non-lethal” defense articles
under the ILA.  During 1999-2000, about 150 oppositionists  underwent civil administration
training at Hurlburt air base in Florida, including Defense Department-run civil affairs
training to administer a post-Saddam government.  The Hurlburt trainees were not brought
into Operation Iraqi Freedom or into the Free Iraqi Forces that deployed to Iraq toward the
end of the major combat phase of the war.
19 One account of Bush Administration internal debates on the strategy is found in Hersh,
Seymour.  “The Debate Within,” The New Yorker, Mar. 11, 2002. 
20 For more information on this program, see CRS Report RL30472, Iraq: Oil For Food
Program, Illicit Trade, and Investigations, by Kenneth Katzman and Christopher Blanchard.
for Constitutional Monarchy (MCM),18 a relatively small party committed to the
return of Iraq’s monarchy, although in limited form.  However, the Clinton
Administration decided  that the opposition was not sufficiently capable to merit
weapons or combat training. 
Bush Administration Policy 
Even though several senior Bush Administration officials had been strong
advocates of a regime change policy, many of the long-standing questions about the
difficulty of that strategy remained,19 and the Bush Administration initially declined
to alter its predecessor’s decision to provide only non-lethal aid under the ILA.  Bush
Administration Iraq policy changed dramatically after the September 11, 2001,
terrorist attacks.  Some accounts say that the Administration was planning, prior to
September 11, to confront Iraq militarily, but President Bush has denied this. 
Secretary of State Powell focused during the first year of the Administration on
strengthening containment of Iraq, which the Bush Administration said had eroded
substantially in the few preceding years.  The cornerstone of the policy was to
achieve U.N. Security Council adoption of a “smart sanctions” plan — relaxing
U.N.-imposed restrictions on exports to Iraq of purely civilian equipment20 in
exchange for improved international enforcement of the U.N. ban on exports to Iraq
of militarily-useful goods.  After about a year of  negotiations,  the major features of
the plan were adopted by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1409 (May 14, 2002).
Post-September 11:  Regime Change Through Military Action.  The
shift to an  active post-September 11 regime change effort followed President Bush’s
State of the Union message on January 29, 2002.  In  that speech, given as the  U.S.-
led war on the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan was winding down,  he
characterized Iraq as part of an “axis of evil” (with Iran and North Korea).  Some
U.S. officials, particularly deputy  Defense Secretary Wolfowitz, asserted that the
United States needed to respond to  the September 11, 2001 attacks by “ending
states” that support terrorist  groups, including Iraq.  Vice President Cheney visited
the Middle East in March 2002 reportedly to consult regional countries about the
possibility of confronting Iraq  militarily, although the leaders visited reportedly
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urged greater U.S. attention to the Arab-Israeli dispute and opposed confrontation
with Iraq.  Some accounts, including the book Plan of Attack, by Bob Woodward
(published in April 2004) say that then Secretary of State Powell and others were
concerned about the potential  consequences of an invasion of Iraq, particularly the
difficulties of building a democracy after major hostilities ended.  Other accounts,
including reported memoranda (the “Downing Street Memo”) by British intelligence
officials, based on conversations with U.S. officials, say that by mid-2002 the
Administration had already decided to go to war against Iraq and that it sought to
develop information about Iraq to support that judgment.  President Bush and British
Prime Minister Tony Blair deny this.  (On December 20, 2001, the House passed
H.J.Res. 75, by a vote of 392-12, calling Iraq’s refusal to readmit U.N. weapons
inspectors a “mounting threat” to the United States.) 
The primary theme in the Bush Administration’s public case for  the need to
confront Iraq was that Iraq posted a “grave and gathering” threat that should be
blunted before the threat became urgent.  The Administration added that regime
change would yield the further benefit of  liberating the Iraqi people from a brutal
dictator and promoting democracy in the Middle East.
! WMD Threat Perception.  Senior U.S. officials asserted the
following about Iraq’s WMD:  (1) that Iraq had worked to rebuild its
WMD programs in the nearly four years since U.N. weapons
inspectors left Iraq and had failed to comply with 16 U.N.
resolutions that demanded complete elimination of all of Iraq’s
WMD programs; (2) that Iraq had used chemical weapons against its
own people (the Kurds) and against Iraq’s neighbors (Iran), implying
that Iraq would not necessarily be deterred from using WMD against
the United States; and (3) that Iraq could transfer its WMD to
terrorists, particularly Al Qaeda, for use in potentially catastrophic
attacks in the United States or elsewhere.  Critics noted that, under
the U.S. threat of retaliation, Iraq did not use WMD against U.S.
troops in the 1991 Gulf war, although it did defy similar U.S.
warnings and burned Kuwait’s oil fields. 
! Links to Al Qaeda.  Iraq was a designated state sponsor of terrorism
during 1979-82, and was again designated after the 1990 invasion of
Kuwait.  Although they did not assert that Saddam Hussein’s regime
had a direct connection to the September 11 attacks or the October
2001 anthrax mailings, senior U.S. officials said  there was evidence
of Iraqi linkages to Al Qaeda, in part because of the presence of pro-
Al Qaeda militant leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in northern Iraq.
The final report of the 9/11 Commission  found no evidence of a
“collaborative operational linkage” between Iraq and Al Qaeda.21 
 Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF):  Major Combat.  Although it is not
certain when the Administration decided on an invasion, from  mid-2002 until the
beginning of 2003 the Administration was building  a force in the region that gave
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24  Iraq’s Assyrians are based primarily in northern Iraq, but there is a substantial diaspora
community living in the United States; the group began integrating into the broader
opposition front in September 2002.  In post-Saddam Iraq, Kanna served on the IGC.
25 Deyoung, Karen, and Daniel Williams, “Training of Iraqi Exiles Authorized,”
Washington Post, Oct. 19, 2002. 
26 Williams, Daniel.  “U.S. Army to Train 1,000 Iraqi Exiles,” Washington Post, Dec. 18,
2002. 
the President the option to order an invasion.  In concert, the Administration tried to
build up and broaden the Iraqi opposition.  On June 16, 2002, the Washington Post
reported that, in early 2002, President Bush authorized stepped up covert activities
by the CIA and special operations forces to destabilize Saddam Hussein.  In August
2002, the State and Defense Departments jointly invited six  opposition groups
(INC, the INA, the KDP, the PUK, SCIRI, and the MCM) to Washington, D.C.  At
the same time, the Administration expanded  its ties to several groups, particularly
those composed primarily of ex-military officers,22 as well as ethnically based groups
such as the Iraqi Turkmen Front,23 and the Assyrian Democratic Movement of
Yonadam Kanna.24  The Administration also began training about 5,000
oppositionists to assist U.S. forces,25 although only about 70 completed training at
an air base (Taszar) in Hungary.26  These recruits served with U.S. forces in the war,
mostly as translators.  
In an effort to obtain U.N. backing for confronting Iraq — support that then
Secretary of State Powell reportedly stressed was needed — President Bush  spoke
before the United Nations General Assembly on September 12, 2002, urging the
United Nations to enforce its  resolutions on Iraq.  The Administration subsequently
acceded to giving Iraq a “final opportunity” to comply with all applicable U.N.
Security Council resolutions by supporting U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441
(November 8, 2002), which gave the U.N. inspection body  UNMOVIC  (U.N.
Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission) new powers of inspection.
Iraq reluctantly accepted it.  UNMOVIC Director Hans Blix and International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) Director Mohammad al-Baradei subsequently briefed the
Security Council on WMD inspections that resumed November 27, 2002.  They
criticized Iraq for failing to pro-actively cooperate, but also noted progress and said
that Iraq might not have retained any WMD.  The Bush Administration asserted that
Iraq was not cooperating with Resolution 1441 because it was not pro-actively
revealing  information to UNMOVIC and the IAEA.  (A “comprehensive” September
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2004 report of the Iraq Survey Group, known as the “Duelfer report,”27 found no
WMD stockpiles or production but said that there was evidence that the regime
retained the intention to reconstitute WMD programs in the future.  The U.S.-led
WMD search ended December 2004.28  The UNMOVIC  search remains technically
active.29)
During this period, Congress debated the costs and risks of an invasion.  It
adopted H.J.Res. 114, authorizing the President to use military force against Iraq if
he determines that doing so is in the national interest and would enforce U.N.
Security Council resolutions.  It passed the House October 11, 2002 (296-133), and
the Senate the following day (77-23).  It was signed October 16, 2002 (P.L. 107-243).
In Security Council debate, opponents of war, including France, Russia, China,
and Germany, said the pre-war WMD inspections showed that Iraq could be
disarmed peacefully or contained indefinitely.  The United States, along with Britain,
Spain, and Bulgaria, maintained that Iraq had not fundamentally decided to disarm.
At a March 16, 2003, summit meeting with the leaders of Britain, Spain, and
Bulgaria at the Azores, President Bush asserted  that diplomatic options to disarm
Iraq had failed.  The following evening, President Bush gave Saddam Hussein and
his sons, Uday and Qusay, an ultimatum to leave Iraq within 48 hours to avoid war.
They refused and OIF began on March 19, 2003. 
In the war, Iraq’s conventional military forces were overwhelmed by the
approximately 380,000-person U.S. and British force assembled (a substantial
proportion of which remained afloat or in supporting roles), although some Iraqi units
and irregulars (“Saddam’s Fedayeen”) put up stiff resistance and used unconventional
tactics.  No WMD was used, although Iraq did fire some ballistic missiles into
Kuwait; it  is not clear whether those missiles were of prohibited ranges (greater than
150 km).  The regime vacated Baghdad on April 9, 2003, although Saddam appeared
publicly with supporters that day in the Adhamiya district of Baghdad.  After the
combat against the Iraqi military, organs of the U.S. government began searching for
evidence of former regime human rights abuses and other violations, in addition to
evidence of WMD. 
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Post-Saddam Governance and Transition
There is growing debate over whether U.S. policy can succeed in establishing
a stable and democratic Iraq at acceptable costs.30  The political transition in post-
Saddam Iraq has continued moving forward, but insurgent violence is still
widespread and lethal, particularly in areas inhabited by Sunni Arabs. 
Occupation Period and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA).
After the fall of the regime, the United States set up an occupation structure,
reportedly grounded in Administration concerns that immediate sovereignty would
favor major anti-Saddam factions but not necessarily produce democracy.  These
concerns had led the Administration to oppose a move by the groups to declare a
provisional government in advance of the U.S. invasion.  The Administration initially
tasked Lt. Gen. Jay Garner (ret.) to direct reconstruction, with a staff of U.S.
government personnel to serve as administrators in Iraq’s ministries.  He headed the
Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), within the
Department of Defense, created by a January 20, 2003 executive order.  Garner and
his staff deployed in April 2003. 
Garner tried to quickly establish a representative successor Iraqi regime.  He and
then White House envoy Zalmay Khalilzad (now Ambassador to Iraq) organized a
meeting in Nassiriyah (April 15, 2003) of about 100 Iraqis of varying ethnicities and
ideologies.  A subsequent  meeting of over 250 notables was held  in Baghdad  (April
26, 2003), ending in agreement to hold a broader meeting one month later to name
an interim Iraqi administration.  However, senior U.S. officials reportedly were
dissatisfied with Garner’s  lax approach, including tolerance for Iraqis naming
themselves as local leaders.  In May 2003, the Administration named former
ambassador L. Paul Bremer to replace Garner by heading a “Coalition Provisional
Authority” (CPA), which subsumed ORHA.  The CPA was an occupying authority
recognized by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1483 (May 22, 2003).  Bremer
suspended Garner’s political transition process and instead agreed to appoint a  25-
to 30-member Iraqi body, which would not have sovereignty but would have more
than purely advisory powers, including nominating ministry heads and drafting an
interim constitution.
In another alteration of the U.S. post-war structure, an “Iraq Stabilization
Group,” under then National Security Adviser (now Secretary of State) Condoleezza
Rice, was formed in October 2003 to coordinate interagency support to the CPA.  It
was headed by a Rice deputy, Robert Blackwill (until he resigned from the
Administration in November 2004).  In August 2005, Secretary Rice named a new
chief coordinator for Iraq; former deputy chief of mission in post-Saddam Baghdad,
James Jeffrey.  A number of critics and studies have written that the Administration’s
post-war policy did not make use of an extensive State Department initiative, called
the “Future of Iraq Project,” that spent at least a year before the war drawing up plans
for administering Iraq after the fall of Saddam.  Some Iraqis who participated are
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now in Iraqi government positions.  The State Department project, which cost $5
million, had 15 working groups on major issues.31
The Iraq Governing Council (IGC).  On July 13, 2003, Bremer named the
25-member Iraq Governing Council.  Its major figures included the leaders of several
of the major anti-Saddam factions mentioned above, contributing to the perception
of the IGC as lacking in legitimacy.  However, some emerging figures were on it,
including Ghazi al-Yawar, a Sunni elder of the Shammar tribe and president of a
Saudi-based technology firm.  (He is now a deputy president.) In September 2003,
the IGC selected a 25-member “cabinet” to run individual ministries, with roughly
the same factional and ethnic balance of the IGC itself (a slight majority of Shiite
Muslims).  The IGC began a process of “de-Baathification” — a purge from
government of about 30,000 persons who held any of the four top ranks of the Baath
Party — and it authorized a war crimes tribunal for Saddam and his associates.  That
function is now performed by a 323-member “Supreme Commission on De-
Baathification.”  The IGC dissolved on June 1, 2004, when an interim government
(of Iyad al-Allawi) was named.
The Handover of Sovereignty and Run-up to Elections  
The Bush Administration initially made the end of  U.S. occupation contingent
on the completion of a new constitution and the holding of national elections for a
new government, tasks expected to be completed by late 2005.  However, Ayatollah
Sistani and others agitated for an early restoration of  Iraqi sovereignty and for direct
elections to choose a new government.  In response, in November 2003, the United
States announced it would return sovereignty to Iraq by June 30, 2004, and that
elections for a  permanent government would be held by the end of  2005. 
Interim Constitution/Transition Roadmap.  The CPA decisions on
transition roadmap were incorporated into an interim constitution, the Transitional
Administrative Law (TAL), which was drafted by a committee dominated by the
major anti-Saddam factions, and signed on March 8, 2004.32  Some of its overarching
points are that
! Elections would be held by January 31, 2005, for a 275-seat
transitional National Assembly.  The election law for the transition
government “shall aim to achieve the goal of having women
constitute no less than 25% of the members of the National
Assembly.”  A permanent constitution would be drafted by August
15, 2005, and put to a national referendum by October 15, 2005.
National elections for a permanent government, under the new
constitution (if it passes), would be held by December 15, 2005, and
take office by December 31, 2005.  
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! Any three provinces can veto the constitution by a two-thirds
majority.  If that happens, a new draft is to be developed and voted
on by October 15, 2006.  In that case, the December 15, 2005,
elections would be for  another interim National Assembly.  
! The Kurds maintained their autonomous “Kurdistan Regional
Government.”  They did receive some powers to contradict or alter
the application of Iraqi law in their provinces, and their peshmerga
militia were allowed to operate. 
! Islam was designated “a source,” but not the primary source, of law,
adding that no law could be passed that contradicts such rights as
peaceful assembly; free expression; equality of men and women
before the law; and the right to strike and demonstrate.
Interim (Allawi) Government/Sovereignty Handover/Resolution
1546/Coalition Military Mandate.  The TAL did not directly address the
formation of an interim government that ran from sovereignty handover in June 2004
until the January 2005 elections.  Sistani’s opposition torpedoed an initial U.S. plan
for doing so; that plan involved the selection of a national assembly through
nationwide “caucuses,” not  elections.  After considering other options, such as the
holding of a traditional assembly,  the United States decided to tap U.N. envoy
Lakhdar Brahimi to select the interim government.33  Although he envisioned a
government of apolitical technocrats, maneuvering by senior politicians led to their
domination of  the interim government.  This government was named on June 1,
2004, and began work.  The IGC dissolved.  The formal handover of sovereignty
took place at about 10:30 A.M. on June 28, 2004, two days before the advertised
June 30 date, partly to confound insurgents. 
 The interim government, whose powers were addressed in an addendum to the
TAL, had a largely ceremonial president (Ghazi al-Yawar) and two deputy presidents
(the Da’wa’s Jafari and the KDP’s Dr. Rowsch Shaways).  Iyad al-Allawi was Prime
Minister, with executive power, and there was a deputy prime minister and 26
ministers.  Six ministers were women, and the ethnicity mix was roughly the same
as in the IGC.  The key defense and interior ministries were headed by Sunni Arabs.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1546  (June 8, 2004) endorsed the handover
of sovereignty, reaffirmed the responsibilities of the interim government, and spelled
out the duration and legal status of U.S.-led forces in Iraq.  Primarily because of
Sistani’s opposition to the TAL’s provision that would allow the Kurds a veto over
a permanent constitution, Resolution 1546 did not explicitly endorse the TAL.  It
also stipulated the following:
! U.S. officials no longer have final authority on non-security issues.
The interim government and the current elected government could
have amended the TAL or revoked CPA decrees, but they did so on
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only a few occasions.  The Kurds had feared that the TAL’s Kurd-
related provisions would be altered, but that did not occur.  
! The coalition’s mandate is reviewed “at the request of the
Government of Iraq or twelve months from the date of this
resolution” (or June 8, 2005); that the mandate would expire when
a permanent government is sworn in at the end of 2005; and that the
mandate would be terminated “if the Iraqi government so requests.”
The Security Council reviewed the mandate in advance of the June
8, 2005 deadline, and no alterations to it were made, leaving the
mandate standing at least until the end of 2005.
! The relationship between U.S. and Iraqi forces is “coordination and
partnership,” as spelled out in an exchange of letters between the
United States and Iraq, annexed to Resolution 1546.  The Iraqi
government does not have a veto over coalition operations, and the
coalition retains the ability to take prisoners.  The Resolution stated
that, at least until the end of 2005 (the end of the transition period),
Iraqi forces will be “a principal partner in the multi-national force
operating in Iraq under unified [American] command pursuant to the
provisions of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1511 (October 16,
2003) and any subsequent resolutions.”  
! An agreement on the status of foreign forces (Status of Forces
Agreement, SOFA) in Iraq was deferred to an elected Iraqi
government.  No such agreement has been signed, to date, and U.S.
forces operate in Iraq and use its facilities (such as Balad air base)
under  temporary memoranda of understanding.  However, Secretary
of Defense Rumsfeld told journalists on July 27, 2005, that U.S.
military lawyers are working with the Iraqis on a SOFA or other
arrangements that would cover U.S. operations in Iraq after a
permanent government takes over.  (On April 22, 2005, it was
publicly reported that the chairman and ranking Member of the
Senate Armed Services Committee had written to Secretary of State
Rice urging that the United States seek a formal invitation from the
Iraqi government for U.S. troops to remain until security can be
ensured by Iraqi forces.) 
! The  Resolution gave the United Nations a major role in assisting
and advising the interim government in preparing for the January 30,
2005  elections and  authorized a coalition component force to
protect U.N. personnel and facilities.  A previous resolution,
Security Council Resolution 1500 (August 14, 2003) established
U.N. Assistance Mission - Iraq (UNAMI).  On August 12, 2004, its
mandate was renewed for one year and on August 11, 2005
(Resolution 1619), for another year.  The size of UNAMI in Iraq is
rising to a target level of about 300.  
! Resolution 1546 (and the TAL) provided for a conference of over
1,000 Iraqis (chosen from all around Iraq by a 60-member
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commission of Iraqis) to choose a 100-seat  “Interim National
Council” as an interim parliament.  The body, selected during
August 13-18, 2004,34 did not have legislative power but was able to
veto government decisions with a 2/3 majority.  The council held
some televised “hearings,” including questioning ministers.  Its work
ended once the National Assembly was elected in January 2005. 
Post-Handover U.S. Structure in Iraq.  The following were additional
consequences of the sovereignty handover, designed in part to lower the profile of
U.S. influence over post-handover Iraq.
! Bremer  departed Iraq for the United States on June 28, 2004, and
the CPA and formal state of occupation ceased.  Subsequently, a
U.S. Ambassador (John Negroponte) established U.S.-Iraq
diplomatic relations for the first time since January 1991.  A U.S.
embassy formally opened on June 30, 2004; it is staffed with  about
1,100 U.S. personnel.35  Negroponte was succeeded in July 2005 by
Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, who was previously Ambassador to
Afghanistan.  (An FY2005 supplemental appropriations, P.L. 109-
13, provides $592 million of $658 million requested to construct a
new embassy in Baghdad and to fund embassy operations.)
! The CPA yielded to Iraq control over its oil revenues and the
Development Fund for Iraq (DFI), subject to monitoring for at least
one year (until June 2005) by the U.N.-mandated International
Advisory and Monitoring Board (IAMB).  Iraq also was given
responsibility for close-out of the “oil-for-food program.”36
Resolution 1483 (May 22, 2004) ended that program as of
November 21, 2003.
! Some CPA functions, such as the advising of local Iraqi
governments, local Iraqi governing councils, and U.S. military units,
were retained as part of an “Iraq Reconstruction and Management
Office (IRMO),” headed since  November 2004 by  Ambassador
William Taylor, formerly U.S. aid coordinator for Afghanistan.
About 150 U.S. personnel working out of  four major centers around
Iraq (satellites of the U.S. Embassy) — Hilla, Basra, Kirkuk, and
Mosul — report to IRMO.  A separate “Project Contracting Office
(PCO),” headed by Charles Hess, reports to the Defense Department;
it funds infrastructure projects such as roads and school renovations.
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! U.S. military headquarters in Baghdad (Combined Joint Task Force-
7, CJTF-7) became a multi-national headquarters “Multinational
Force-Iraq, MNF-I,” headed by four-star U.S. Gen. George Casey.
Lt. Gen.  John Vines heads the “Multinational Corps-Iraq” as
operational commander of U.S. forces.  Before dissolving,  the CPA
extended its orders giving U.S. military people, and some
contractors, immunity from prosecution by Iraqi courts.37
January 30, 2005 Elections/New Government.  On January 30, 2005,
national elections were held for a transitional National Assembly, 18 provincial
councils, and the Kurdish regional assembly.  As noted above, the elections gave the
UIA a slim majority (140) of the 275 seats in the new Assembly;  the two main
Kurdish parties control 75 seats; interim Prime Minister Allawi’s bloc won 40 seats;
and interim President Ghazi Yawar’s slate won five seats, with several other parties
splitting the remaining 15 seats.  (See CRS Report RS21968, Iraq: Elections,
Government, and Constitution, by Kenneth Katzman.)
The new government took shape during March-May 2005, although U.S.
officials, including Secretary of State Rice, said it was not sufficiently inclusive of
the Sunni minority.  That inclusiveness, in the view of U.S. officials and most outside
observers, is the key to stabilizing Iraq. 
! The 275-seat Assembly first convened on March 16.  It  chose Sunni
parliamentarian Hajim al-Hassani as speaker on March 29.  He was
a member of the Iraqi Islamic Party, which boycotted the election,
but he ran for election on Ghazi al-Yawar’s slate.  Sistani aide
Hussein Shahristani and Kurdish official Arif Tayfour were selected
deputy speakers. 
! On April 6, in keeping with a UIA-Kurdish agreement on major
Kurdish concerns,  PUK leader Talabani was  selected President.
His two deputies are  SCIRI official Adel Abdul Mahdi (finance
minister in the Allawi government) and Ghazi al-Yawar (president
in the Allawi government).  They obtained the required two-thirds
Assembly vote.  The three then nominated Ibrahim al-Jafari as Prime
Minister; he was confirmed the next day. 
! On April 28, with the one-month deadline for naming a cabinet
approaching, Jafari received near-unanimous Assembly approval for
a cabinet of 32 ministers and three deputy prime ministers.
However, five cabinet positions and a deputy prime ministership
were not initially filled, pending an agreement to appoint additional
Sunnis.  Chalabi and KDP activist Rosch Shaways were named as
deputy prime ministers. 
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! On May 7, Jafari continued filling out the cabinet by appointing the
five  remaining permanent ministers (2 of which were Sunnis)  and
one (Sunni) deputy prime minister.  One of the Sunnis was Defense
Minister, Sadoun al-Dulaymi, a former official in Saddam Hussein’s
security service who broke with the regime in 1984 and lived in
exile in Saudi Arabia.  Another Sunni is Minister of Industry.
However, the other Sunni ministers hold slots they consider
relatively unimportant, such as the ministries of culture and of
women’s affairs.  With all slots filled, of the 32 ministers, 16 are
Shiites, 8 are Kurds, 6 are Sunnis, one is Christian (a Christian
woman is Minister of Science and Technology), and one is
Turkoman (Minister of Housing and Construction Jasim al-Jafar).
Six are women.  
The new government has received some diplomatic support, even though most
of its neighbors, except Iran, resent the Shiite and Kurdish domination of the regime.
At a June 22, 2005, international conference on Iraq held in Brussels, Jordan and
Egypt pledged to appoint ambassadors to Baghdad.  Perhaps in an effort to derail that
effort, on July 2, insurgents kidnaped and killed Egypt’s top diplomat in Baghdad;
he was to be appointed the ambassador there.  Jordan did go forward with  appointing
an ambassador.  On July 5, insurgents attacked and wounded Bahrain’s top diplomat
in Iraq.  In late July, insurgents captured and killed Algeria’s two highest ranking
envoys in Iraq, prompting Algeria to pull out.  However, in early September 2005,
Kuwait pledged to re-establish full diplomatic relations with the new government. 
Drafting the Permanent Constitution and Next Election.  On May 10,
the National Assembly appointed a 55-member committee, composed of Assembly
members, to begin drafting the permanent constitution.  SCIRI cleric Humam al-
Hamoudi was named chair.  Initially, only two of the appointees were Sunni Arabs,
prompting U.S. and Iraqi public criticism of low Sunni Arab representation.
Subsequently, an agreement was reached in June 2005 to  add 15 Sunni Arabs and
1 member of the Sabian sect as voting members, and 10 more Sunni Arabs as
advisers.  On July 19, 2005, two of the Sunnis (one full member and one adviser)
were assassinated by unknown insurgents.
The committee did not complete the draft by the deadline of August 15, 2005,
extending that period for seven days and then even further.38  On August 28, 2005,
the drafters submitted what they called a final draft to the Assembly but said that
some issues remain unresolved due to Sunni opposition.  Talks continued, and on
September 18, with the Sunnis still unsatisfied, the full Assembly approved the draft,
with some minor final amendments requested by Sunnis.  The United Nations began
printing the 5 million copies to be distributed to Iraqi households.  With Sunnis
registering in large numbers to try to vote it down (two-thirds of the voters in three
provinces), U.S. Ambassador Khalilzad continued negotiations; he obtained a last-
minute compromise under which the Sunni-based Iraqi Islamic Party backed the
constitution with the added provisions that it would be reviewed in 2006 and a
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referendum held on any proposed amendments.  The constitution is discussed in
greater depth in CRS Report RS21968,  Iraq: Elections, Government, and
Constitution, by Kenneth Katzman.  The major provisions of the final draft voted on
October 15 are the following:
! Islam is  “a main source of law,” but each sect and family has the
option of using civil or  Islamic law (Sharia) in domestic situations.
Many Iraqi women fear that their male elders will decide on use of
Sharia courts, which might deprive them of substantial rights on
matters such as divorce and inheritances.  The 25% electoral goal for
women is retained (as a permanent feature), and the concept of equal
rights for men and women is stated.  
! The draft’s provision for a weak central government (“federalism”)
continues to  provoke Sunni opposition.  The draft, at the behest of
the Kurds and Shiites, whose regions have substantial oil reserves,
allows groups of provinces to band together to form autonomous
“regions” with their own regional governments and internal security
forces.  The Sunnis oppose this concept because their region lacks
oil and they depend on the central government for revenues. The
Sunnis reportedly are unhappy with a provision of the draft that
would place any new energy discoveries under at least partial control
of regional governments, rather than the central government.  
! In an effort to satisfy the Sunnis, the drafters have established a
second chamber of the National Assembly (“Federation Council”),
which will consist of provincial representatives, but its powers and
method of selection are not specified in the draft.  
! The Sunnis only obtained partial limitations on the extent of de-
Baathification.  The final sets of amendments also moved toward the
Sunnis’ position in stating that Iraq has historically been a part of the
Arab nation.  
Despite the eleventh hour compromise, preliminary results released by the
Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq (IECI) indicate that Sunnis
overwhelmingly voted against the draft but only obtained a two-thirds “no” vote in
two (Anbar and Salahuddin) provinces.  The mostly Sunni province of Diyala voted
slightly in favor (about 51%), and results from mostly Sunni Nineveh were not
released. The vote itself was mostly peaceful with about 60% turnout (10 million of
15 million eligible voters).  The Administration praised Sunni participation, even to
vote against it, as evidence they are moving into the political process.  
Democracy-Building and Local Governance.  The United States and its
coalition partners are also trying to build civil society and democracy  at the local
level.  U.S. officials say Iraqis are freer than at any time in the past 30 years, with a
free press and the ability to organize politically.  On the other hand, the State
Department report on human rights in Iraq, released on February 28, 2005, notes
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numerous human rights abuses of the interim government, mostly by the police, but
attributes the abuses to the interim government’s drive to secure the country.39  
According to a State Department report to Congress in July 2005 detailing how
the FY2004 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 108-106) is being spent (“2207
Report”), a total of $941 million has been allocated for “democracy and governance”
activities, and about $56 million is allocated for related “rule of law” programs.  An
additional $133 million is allocated to build and secure courts.  An additional $360
million for these activities was requested in the FY2006 regular foreign aid
appropriations request, but those funds are not in the House-passed version of  (H.R.
3057).  The Senate-passed version fully funds the Administration’s FY2006 foreign
aid request (presumably including all Iraq-related accounts) and contains an
amendment by Senator Kennedy specifying $28 million each to the International
Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute for democracy promotion
in Iraq.  Both those organizations, as well as the U.S. Institute of Peace and other
groups, have been implementing U.S. funded democracy-building programs in Iraq.
Run by the State Department Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs (State/INL), USAID, and State Department Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL), activities funded, aside from
assistance for the January 30 elections, include the following.
! Several projects attempting to increase the transparency of the
justice system, computerize Iraqi legal documents, train judges and
lawyers, develop various aspects of law, such as commercial laws,
promote legal reform, and support the drafting of the permanent
constitution.
! The “Community Action Program”:  local reconstruction projects
such as school refurbishment that are voted on by village and town
representatives.  About 225 such projects have been completed thus
far.  
! Assistance to local governments on budgeting, finance, taxation,
record computerization, and 30,000 “civic dialogue activities.”
! An orientation manual for members of the National Assembly.
! Independent  media promotion.
! Women’s democracy initiatives, including candidate training, anti-
violence programs, and political participation.
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs).  Secretary of State Rice
announced in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations on October 19, 2005,
that the Administration will be forming Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)
composed of U.S. diplomats and military personnel to assist local Iraqi governing
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institutions, such as the provincial councils (elected in the January 2005 elections),
representatives of the Iraqi provincial governors, and local ministry representatives.
According to Rice, the PRT concept will support the U.S. strategy to “clear, hold, and
build” areas cleared of insurgents through U.S. military combat.  The concept is a
follow-on to the Provincial Reconstruction Development Committees set up during
July - October 2005, according to the October 2005 “2207 Report.”40  During April-
July 2005, the United States made available $241 million ($80 million in
Commanders’ Emergency Response Program, CERP, funds and $161 million in
USAID-administered Community Action Program and Local Governance Program
funds) to lay the ground work for this initiative.  
Economic Reconstruction and U.S. Assistance
The Administration asserts that economic reconstruction will contribute to
stability, and U.S. officials have sought to ensure that there are adequate resources
for governance and reconstruction.  Since September 2004, the State Department
decided to shift focus to smaller scale projects that could quickly employ Iraqis and
yield concrete benefits.  Administration officials say that Iraq’s economy is
recovering, and that many Iraqis are demonstrating their confidence by buying goods
and investing in property, but U.S. officials acknowledge that the difficult security
environment has slowed reconstruction.  Electricity was above pre-war levels in mid-
2004 and is now about at pre-war levels (102,000 MWh), giving Baghdad  about 12
hours of power per day, with a national average of 14 hours per day.  However,
insurgent attacks caused a sharp drop in mid-October to 6.3 hours per day for
Baghdad.  Sanitation, health care, and education have improved statistically.41  Lines
for gasoline often last many hours, and the government has said it will continue to
subsidize gas purchases, virtually ensuring that demand will continue to grow.  
The Oil Industry.  As the driver of Iraq’s economy, the rebuilding of the oil
industry has received substantial U.S. attention.  Before the war, it was widely
asserted by Administration officials that Iraq’s vast oil reserves, believed second only
to those of Saudi Arabia, would fund much, if not all, reconstruction costs.  The oil
industry infrastructure suffered little damage during the U.S.-led invasion (only about
nine oil wells were set on fire), but it has become a target of insurgents.  Insurgents
have particularly focused their attacks on pipelines in northern Iraq; those lines  feed
the Iraq-Turkey oil pipeline that is loaded at the Mediterranean port of  Ceyhan,
Turkey.  This has kept production and exports below expected levels, although high
world oil prices have more than compensated for the output shortfall.  The United
States imports about 660,000 barrels per day of crude oil from Iraq. 
A related issue is long-term development of Iraq’s oil industry and which
foreign energy firms, if any, might receive preference for contracts to explore Iraq’s
vast reserves.  Russia, China, and others are said to fear that the United States will
seek to develop Iraq’s oil industry with minimal participation of firms from other
countries.  Iraq’s interim government has contracted for a study of the extent of Iraq’s
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oil reserves, and it has contracted with Royal Dutch/Shell to formulate a blueprint to
develop the gas sector. 























2.5 mbd 1.314 mbd 2.2 mbd $17 billion $19.22billion
Note:  Oil export revenue is net of a 5% deduction for reparations to the victims of the 1990 Iraqi
invasion and occupation of Kuwait, as provided for in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1483 (May
22, 2003).  That 5% deduction is paid into a U.N. escrow account controlled by the U.N.
Compensation Commission to pay judgments awarded.
International Donations.  A World Bank estimate, released in October 2003,
said Iraq reconstruction would require about $56 billion during 2004-2007, including
$21 billion in U.S. pledges.  At an October 2003 donors’ conference in Madrid,
donors pledged about $13.6 billion, including $8 billion from foreign governments
and $5.5 billion in loans from the World Bank and IMF.  Of the funds pledged by
other foreign governments, about $3 billion has been disbursed, as of September
2005, according to the October 2005 “2207 Report.”  Included in that figure is about
$436 million in International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans, which were disbursed in
2004 after Iraq cleared up $81 million in arrears to the Fund dating from Saddam
Hussein’s regime.  The World Bank reportedly is considering returning staff to Iraq;
they  had left Iraq after the August 2003 bombing of U.N. headquarters in Baghdad.
The U.S. Military and Reconstruction.  The U.S. military has attempted
to promote reconstruction to deprive the insurgency of popular support.  A key tool
in this effort is the funding of small projects to promote trust among the population
and promote interaction of Iraqis with the U.S. military.  Called the Commanders
Emergency Response Program (CERP), the DOD funds are controlled and disbursed
by U.S. commanders at the tactical level.  The total amount of CERP funds for Iraq
for FY2005 was $718 million, spent on 7,100 different projects.  Additional funds
for this program are provided by the Iraqi government.  The various programs
employ about 25,000 Iraqis.  
A similar program began in October 2004, called the Commander’s
Humanitarian Relief and Reconstruction Projects (CHHRP).  About $86 million in
FY2005 was  allocated for this program.  These funds are for small projects, such as
water and sewage repairs, mainly in restive Sunni towns such as Ramadi and
Samarra, but also in the Kurdish areas.  
 Supplemental U.S. Funding.  Three supplemental appropriations include
funds for reconstruction.  An  FY2003 supplemental, P.L. 108-11, appropriated about
$2.5 billion for Iraq reconstruction.  An FY2004 supplemental appropriations (P.L.
108-106) provided about $18.5 billion for Iraq reconstruction (not including about
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$50 billion appropriated for U.S. military costs).  The two total $20.912 billion
available for reconstruction.  Of those funds, $17.156 billion has been obligated, and,
of that, $11.248 billion has been disbursed as of October 19, 2005.  
The 2207 Report mandated by the FY2004 supplemental (P.L. 108-106)
specifies how those funds are allocated.  According to the latest 2207 report (October
2005), the allocations are as follows:
! $5.018 billion:  Security and Law Enforcement; 
! $2.242 billion:  Justice, Public Safety, Infrastructure, and Civil
Society (includes $995 million for “democracy building activities);
! $4.31 billion:  Electricity Sector;
! $1.723 billion:  Oil Infrastructure;
! $2.146 billion:  Water Resources and Sanitation;
! $509 million:  Transportation and Communications;
! $334 million:  Roads, Bridges, and Construction;
! $786 million:  Health Care;
! $795 million:  Private Sector Employment Development (includes
$352 million for debt relief for Iraq);
! $363 million:  Education, Refugees, Human Rights, Democracy, and
Governance (includes $99 million for education, and $25 million for
“human rights” programs and “civic programs)”; and
! $213 million:  USAID administrative expenses.
FY2005 Iraq Security Forces Funding/FY2006.  No new funds for Iraq
reconstruction were requested in the Administration’s regular budget request for
FY2005.  One FY2005 supplemental appropriation of $25 billion will be used mostly
for military costs in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The second FY2005 supplemental (P.L.
109-13) contained virtually all the funds requested — $68 billion to cover U.S.
military costs for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and $5.7 billion to train and equip
Iraqi forces.
As noted above, the Administration’s regular FY2006 foreign aid budget request
asked for $360 million in funds for democracy and governance activities in Iraq.  An
additional $26 million was requested to improve the capacity of Iraq’s police and
justice sector.  The House-passed  version of the FY2006 foreign aid appropriations
(H.R. 3057) does not provide the requested funds for Iraq on the grounds that
sufficient funds remain from previous appropriations.  The Senate-passed version
fully funded the Administration request and thereby contains the funds requested for
Iraq as well as the amendment discussed above for additional democracy promotion
funds.
Lifting U.S. Sanctions.  The Bush Administration has lifted most U.S.
sanctions on Iraq, beginning with Presidential Determinations issued under
authorities provided by P.L. 108-7 (appropriations for FY2003) and P.L. 108-11
(FY2003 supplemental):
! On July 30, 2004,  President Bush issued an executive order ending
the package of sanctions imposed on Iraq following the 1990
invasion of Kuwait.  Those measures were in Executive Order 12722
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(August 2, 1990) and 12724 (August 9, 1990), issued after Iraq’s
August 2, 1990, invasion of Kuwait.  They  imposed a ban on U.S.
trade with and investment in Iraq and froze Iraq’s assets in the
United States.  The Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990 (Section 586 of P.L.
101-513, signed November 5, 1990) reinforced those orders.  
! On September 8, 2004, the President designated Iraq a beneficiary
of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), enabling Iraqi
products to have duty-free tariff treatment for entry into the United
States.  
! On September 24, 2004, Iraq was removed from the U.S. list of state
sponsors of terrorism under Section 6(j) of the Export
Administration Act (P.L. 96-72).  Iraq is thus no longer barred from
receiving U.S. foreign assistance, U.S. votes in favor of international
loans, and sales of munitions list items (arms and related equipment
and services).  Exports of dual use items (items that can have
military applications) are no longer subject to strict licensing
procedures.42  The July 30, 2004, order did not unfreeze any assets
in the United States of the former regime.
! The FY2005 supplemental request asks to remove Iraq from a
named list of countries for which the United States is required to
withhold its voluntary contributions to international organizations.
The requirement is for the withholding of a proportionate share of
the cost of any programs such organizations conduct for those
countries.  That provision is in P.L. 109-13. 
Debt Relief/WTO Membership.  The Administration is attempting to
persuade other countries to forgive Iraq’s debt  built up during the regime of Saddam
Hussein.  The debt is estimated to total about $116 billion, not including reparations
dating to the first Persian Gulf war.  On November 21, 2004, the “Paris Club” of 19
industrialized nations agreed to cancel about 80% of the $39 billion Iraq owes them.
However, the Persian Gulf states that supported Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war have
not to date firmly agreed to write-off Iraq’s approximately $50 billion in debt to those
countries (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, and Qatar).  On December
17, 2004, the United States signed an agreement with Iraq  writing off 100% of Iraq’s
$4.1 billion debt to the United States; that debt consisted of principle and interest
from about $2 billion in defaults on Iraqi agricultural credits from the 1980s.43  On
December 13, 2004, the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreed to begin accession
talks with Iraq. 
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Political and Security Challenges, 
Responses, and Options
The Bush Administration cites the relatively successful elections and the growth
of the Iraqi security forces to assert that current U.S. policy will lead to stability and
democracy and should be maintained.  However,  some opinion polls released since
June 2005 and statements by several Members of Congress show growing
nervousness over continued U.S. casualties and persistent violence in Iraq.  Some
Members of Congress and outside experts are calling for significant policy changes.
The Insurgent Challenge
 The Sunni Arab-led insurgency against U.S. and Iraqi forces has defied most
U.S. expectations in  intensity and duration.44Although they are hesitant to assess the
size of the insurgency, U.S. commanders say that insurgents probably number
approximately 12,000-20,000.  Some Iraqi (intelligence) officials have publicly
advanced higher estimates of about 40,000 active insurgents, helped by another
150,000 persons in supporting roles.  About 15,000 suspected insurgents are now in
prison in Iraq.  
  
The insurgents, believed to be loosely coordinated at the regional although
probably not national level, have failed to derail the political transition.  They
mounted only about 35 attacks during the October 15, 2005, constitutional
referendum, but they are having some success in their attempt to paint the Iraqi
government as ineffective and beholden to the United States for its survival.  Targets
include not only U.S. forces and Iraqi officials and security forces but also Iraqi
civilians working for U.S. authorities, foreign contractors, oil export and gasoline
distribution facilities, and water, power, and other infrastructure facilities.  Recently,
insurgent attacks have caused blackouts and water shutdowns in parts of Baghdad.
The bulk of the insurgents appear to be motivated by opposition to perceived
U.S. rule in Iraq, but  some insurgents  might be motivated by the goal of establishing
an Islamic state.  Others want to bring Sunnis back into power, whether Baathist or
not, or to at least carve out for Sunni Arabs a larger role in post-Saddam governance.
The generally older and more well-funded former Baathists might be hoping to bring
the party, and perhaps Saddam Hussein, back to power.  Increasingly, the violence
is taking on a sectarian character, with bodies of groups of Sunni or Shiite civilians
often found bound and gagged, dumped in rivers or fields, apparent victims of attack
or retaliation.  The following major insurgent factions are composed mostly of Iraqis:
! The Islamic Army of Iraq.  Claimed responsibility for a January 9,
2005 attack that killed eight Ukranian troops and one Kazakh
soldier. 
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! Muhammad’s Army.  This faction is said to be led by radical Sunni
cleric Abdullah al-Janabi, who was said to be in Fallujah before the
November 2004 U.S. offensive there.  
! The Al Haq Army.  Active in and around Ramadi.  
The U.N. Security Council has adopted the U.S. interpretation of the insurgency.
On August 4, 2005, it adopted Resolution 1618, condemning the “terrorist attacks
that have taken place in Iraq,” including attacks on Iraqi election workers,
constitution drafters, and foreign diplomats in Iraq.  
Sunni Clerics and Political Relations with the Insurgency.  There is
no one recognized Iraqi Sunni leader in Iraq now that Saddam has been toppled.
Some leading Sunni personalities, such as Ghazi al-Yawar, were discussed above.
Two Sunni organizations are now participating openly in the political process:  the
Sunni Endowment, a government agency responsible for Sunni religious affairs,
headed by Ahmad al-Samarrai; and  the National Dialogue Council, headed by Saleh
al-Mutlak.  The latter is considered a loose grouping of ex-Baathists and other Sunnis
who want to achieve a larger role for Sunnis through negotiations with Iraq’s newly
dominant communities.  The Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) of Muhsin Abd al-Hamid has
alternated between participation and boycott of the political process.  It participated
in the IGC and registered for the January 30 election but pulled out of the vote in
December 2004, shortly after the U.S. assault on Fallujah.  It initially  advocated that
Sunnis vote “no” on the constitution but later struck a last-minute agreement on
amendments to the constitution (see above) and supported a “yes” vote.  However,
the IIP’s endorsement apparently did not result in Sunni support for the draft. 
Many Iraqi insurgents appear to respect a network of Sunni Islamist clerics or
politicians that have opposed the U.S. presence and have not participated in any
governing structures.  These clerics belong to an organization called the Muslim
Clerics Association (MCA), which claims to represent 3,000 Sunni mosques
countrywide.  The MCA is led by Harith al-Dhari, who heads the large Umm al-Qura
mosque in Baghdad,  and Abd al-Salam al-Qubaysi, leader of the Abu Hanifa mosque
in Baghdad.  The MCA has, on occasion, succeeded in persuading insurgent groups
to release Western or other hostages.  It urged a boycott of the January 2005 elections
and a “no” vote on the constitution.  U.S. officials acknowledge openly that some
Sunni representatives from the two harder-line Sunni organizations mentioned above
have held discussions with U.S. military personnel and diplomats about conditions
under which they might pressure insurgents to enter the political process. 
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Foreign Insurgents/Zarqawi
A relatively small but important component of the insurgency are non-Iraqi
fighters.45  A study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies released in
September 2005 said that about 3,500 foreign fighters are in Iraq, which would
represent just under 20% of the overall insurgency if the U.S. military estimate of
20,000 total insurgents is correct.  According to the study, the foreign fighters come
mostly from Algeria, Syria, Yemen, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, with Saudis
constituting only about 350 of the 3,000 estimated foreign fighters.  The Department
of Defense said on October 20, 2005, that 312 foreign fighters had been captured in
Iraq since April 2005.  
 A major portion of the foreign insurgent contingent is commanded by Abu
Musab al-Zarqawi, a 39-year-old Jordanian Arab who reputedly fought in
Afghanistan during the 1980s alongside other Arab volunteers for the “jihad” against
the Soviet Union.  Zarqawi came to Iraq in late 2001 after escaping the U.S. war
effort in Afghanistan along with several hundred Arab fighters.  He made his way to
northern Iraq, after transiting Iran and Saddam-controlled Iraq, eventually taking
refuge with a Kurdish Islamist faction called Ansar al-Islam,46 near the town of
Khurmal.47  His group occasionally clashed with PUK fighters around Halabja.  After
the Ansar enclave was destroyed in Operation Iraqi Freedom, Zarqawi fled to the
Sunni Arab areas of Iraq and began  using  other organizational names, including the
Association of Unity and Jihad, which was named as an FTO on October 15, 2004.
Since then, as he has affiliated with bin Laden, he has changed his organization’s
name to “Al Qaeda Jihad in Mesopotamia” (Iraq’s name before its formation in the
1920s).  It is named as an FTO, assuming that designation from the earlier Unity and
Jihad organizational title.48  Press reports said that U.S. forces almost caught him near
Ramadi in February 2005, and his aides posted web messages that he was seriously
wounded in a subsequent U.S. raid but then regained health.  
 
Zarqawi’s faction has been the subject of substantial U.S. counter-efforts
because of its alleged perpetration of  “terrorist” attacks — suicide and other attacks
against both combatant and civilian targets.  Some of the attacks attributed to this
faction include the bombings in Baghdad of  U.N. headquarters at the Canal Hotel
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(August 19, 2003)49 and the August 2003 bombing that killed SCIRI leader
Mohammad Baqr Al Hakim.  The group, and related factions, have also kidnaped a
total of over 250 foreigner workers, many of whom have subsequently been killed.
More recently, the group has been targeting Iraqi Shiite festivals and ceremonies,
most likely hoping to provoke civil conflict between Sunnis and Shiites; in
September 2005, Zarqawi declared war on Iraq’s Shiites, according to a website
attributed to his followers.  However, this tactic reportedly has caused tensions and
occasional armed clashes with Iraqi insurgent factions that oppose attacks on purely
civilian targets.  There is some speculation that Zarqawi’s faction, or a related group,
might have committed the August 19, 2005, failed rocket attack in the Jordanian port
of Aqaba against two U.S. warships docked there.  
An offshoot of Zarqawi’s group is called “Ansar al-Sunna,” or  Partisans of the
Traditions [of the Prophet].  This group reportedly blends both foreign volunteers and
Iraqi insurgents.  Ansar al-Sunna claimed responsibility for the December 21, 2004,
attack on Camp Marez in Mosul that killed 22, including 14 U.S. soldiers, and has
been responsible for several subsequent attacks particularly in the Mosul area.  
Outside Support.  Some public U.S. assessments say the insurgents, both
Iraqi and non-Iraqi, receive funding  from wealthy donors in neighboring countries
such as Saudi Arabia,50 where a number of clerics have publicly called on Saudis to
support the Iraqi insurgency.  Other accounts say that insurgent leaders are using
Syria as a base to funnel money and weapons to their fighters in Iraq,51 an assessment
that drew additional credence when Syria turned Saddam’s half brother Sabawi over
to Iraqi authorities in February 2005.  In September 2005, U.S. ambassador Khalilzad
publicly accused Syria of allowing training camps in Syria for Iraqi insurgents to
gather and train before going into Iraq.  These reports have led to U.S. warnings to
and imposition of additional U.S. sanctions against Syria and to the U.S. Treasury
Department’s blocking of assets of some suspected financiers of the insurgency.  
Defense Secretary Rumsfeld confirmed in August 2005 that some explosives
from Iran had been intercepted in Iraq, although he did not assert that the shipment
was authorized by Iran’s government.  Others believe that outside support is minimal
and that the insurgents have ample supplies of arms and explosives; according to the
Defense Department, about 250,000 tons of munitions remain around in Iraq in arms
depots not secured after the regime fell.  
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U.S. Responses to the Insurgency
At times, such as after the capture of Saddam Hussein in December 2003, some
U.S. officials have expressed optimism that the insurgency would be defeated.  There
was a lull in insurgent attacks after the January 30, 2005 elections.  Because attacks
have returned to prior levels of about 70 per day, U.S. officials and commanders now
say that the insurgency cannot be defeated through military force alone but requires
political solutions.  The exception to this view is expressed by Vice President
Cheney, who said in June 2005 that the insurgency was “in its last throes.”  In concert
with Administration  events to commemorate the first anniversary (June 28, 2005)
of the handover of sovereignty, top U.S. defense officials in Iraq and the region
testified before Congress and appeared on U.S. news programs, asserting progress but
acknowledging that the insurgency has not diminished in 2005.
U.S. Counter-Insurgent Operations.  U.S. officials say that U.S. forces
will remain in Iraq to defend the Iraqi government until it is capable of securing Iraq
on its own.  About 150,000 U.S. troops are in Iraq, with about another 50,000 troops
in Kuwait and the Persian Gulf region supporting  OIF, and another 22,000 coalition
partner forces in Iraq from 29 other countries. 
A major focus of U.S. combat is in the province of al-Anbar, which includes the
city of  Fallujah.  In April 2004, after the city fell under insurgent control (it was run
by a “mujahedin shura,” or council of insurgents), U.S. commanders contemplated
routing insurgents from the city but, concerned about  collateral damage and U.S.
casualties, they agreed to allow former Iraqi officers to patrol it.  This solution
quickly unraveled and, as 2004 progressed, about two dozen other Sunni-inhabited
towns, including Baqubah, Balad, Tikrit, Mosul, Ramadi, Samarra, and Tal Affar, as
well as the small towns south of Baghdad, fell under insurgent influence.  
U.S. forces, joined by Iraqi forces, began operations in September 2004 to expel
insurgents from these cities.  Most notable was “Operation Phantom Fury” on
Fallujah (November 2004), involving 6,500 U.S. Marines and 2,000 Iraqi troops.
U.S. forces captured the city within about ten days, killing an estimated 1,200
insurgents and finding numerous large weapons caches and a possible chemical
weapons lab, but most of the guerrillas left before the U.S. offensive began.  Over
half of  the city’s 250,000 have now returned, and some reconstruction has begun
there, using U.S. funds from a $246 million “post-battle reconstruction
initiative,”52drawn from funds appropriated in the FY2004 supplemental (P.L. 108-
106).  However, some fighting continues there.  Funds from the initiative are also
being used for reconstruction in other cities damaged by U.S. operations, such as
Samarra and Najaf, a mostly Shiite city that was damaged by the Sadr uprisings in
2004. 
Since May 2005, U.S. (and Iraqi) forces have conducted several operations
(Operations Matador, Dagger, Spear, Lightning, and Sword) to clear contingents of
foreign fighters that had entered Iraq near the towns of Qaim, Husaybah, and Ubaydi,
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and had dug in there, and other insurgents in Hit, Haditha, and Baghdad itself (near
the airport).  U.S. forces claim to have cleared these areas of insurgents, although
U.S. commanders say some of the fighters might have melted into neighboring areas
and could re-infiltrate once U.S. and Iraqi forces leave.  In September 2005, U.S. and
Iraqi forces conducted a major offensive to clear insurgents from Tal Afar, and U.S.
officials say Iraqi forces are remaining in the city to prevent re-infiltration.  Despite
the U.S. operations, violence is prevalent in virtually all of the major Sunni cities. 
Casualties.  As of October 24, 2005, about 1,998 U.S. forces and about 200
coalition partner soldiers have died in OIF, as well as over 100  U.S. civilians
working on contract to U.S. institutions in Iraq.  Of  U.S. deaths, about 1,850 have
occurred since President Bush declared an end to “major combat operations” in Iraq
on May 1, 2003, and about 1,550 of the U.S. deaths were by hostile action.  About
2,000 members of the Iraqi Security Forces, which are analyzed below, have been
killed in action, to date. 
Building Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)53  
A major pillar of current U.S. policy is to equip and train Iraqi security forces
(ISF) that could secure Iraq by themselves and enable U.S. forces to draw down.
President Bush stated in his June 28, 2005 speech, “Our strategy can be summed up
this way: As the Iraqis stand up, we will stand down.”54  The conference report on the
latest FY2005 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 109-13) required a Defense
Department report to Congress on the status of securing Iraq, particularly the building
of the ISF.  The most recent such report, released October 2005, entitled “Measuring
Stability and Security in Iraq,” generally reiterates U.S. official statements of
progress in Iraq and contains details of the training of the ISF.
The Department of Defense reports that, as of October 19, 2005, there are
206,200 total members of the ISF: 87,800 “operational” military forces under Iraq’s
Ministry of Defense and 104,300 police/lighter forces “trained and equipped” under
the Ministry of Interior.  They are organized into 116 battalions.  The total force goal
is 325,000 ISF by August 2007.
The raw numbers of ISF are subject to debate.  In October 2005, U.S.
commanders clarified their assessments of readiness of these forces as follows (each
battalion has about 750 personnel):
! Battalions in Category One (fully independent):  1 (military only,
down from 3 reported at this level in June 2005);
! Battalions in Category Two (Iraqi unit capable of taking the lead in
operations): 45 (43 military and 2 police battalions); 
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! Battalions in Category Three: (Iraqi unit capable of fighting
alongside U.S./partner forces):  80 (54 military and 26 police
battalions); and
! Category Four:  unit not yet formed.
 In addition, the police-related component of the ISF totals include possibly tens
of thousands (according to the GAO on March 15, 2005) who are absent-without-
leave and might have deserted.  The police generally live with their families, rather
than in barracks, and are therefore hard to account for.  
Assessments of ISF effectiveness also vary widely.  U.S. officials and reports
praise their performance in the January 30 and October 15 election days. U.S.
commanders cite as evidence of their growing confidence the September 2005
offensive in Tal Afar in which Iraqi units were in the lead.  In August 2005, U.S.
commanders turned full control of the city of Najaf to the ISF, and on October 3,
control of the Khark, Rusafa, Thawra, and Adhamiya districts of Baghdad were
turned over to control of the 6th Iraqi Army Division. 
At the same time, some U.S. commanders say that the ISF  continue to lack an
effective command structure, independent initiative, or commitment to the mission,
and that it could fragment if U.S. troops draw down.55  U.S. commanders said in
October 2005 that the ISF is still 18 months to two years away from being able to
operate independently.  A report on the Iraqi police by the offices of the Inspector
General of the State and Defense Departments, released July 15, 2005, said that many
recruits are only marginally literate, and some recruits are actually insurgents trying
to infiltrate the ISF (p.3).56  In one notable example, about three quarters of the 4,000-
person police force in Mosul collapsed in the face of an insurgent uprising there in
November 2004.  In March 2005, 400 Iraqi soldiers deployed to the border town of
Husaybah virtually disintegrated, allowing foreign fighters to enter Iraq from over the
Syrian border.  U.S. forces have had particular difficulty recruiting Sunni Muslims
to the ISF because they are generally viewed as traitors by their community if they
join the ISF. 
  
The accelerated training and equipping of the Iraqis is a key part of  U.S. policy.
Maj. Gen. David Petraeus, who had served until late 2003 as commander of the 101st
Airborne Division, oversaw the training of the ISF as head of the Multinational
Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I).57  In September 2005, he was
replaced by Maj. Gen. Martin Dempsey.  The Administration has been shifting much
U.S. reconstruction funding into this security force training and equipping mission.
According to the October 2005 “2207 report,” a total of $5.02  billion in FY2004
funds has  been allocated to build (train, equip, provide facilities for, and in some
cases provide pay for) the ISF.  That is about 50% more than was originally allocated
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for this function when the supplemental funds were first apportioned.  Of the funds
available, $4.666 has been obligated as of September 28.  In addition, as  a result of
the deficiencies of the ISF, in 2005 the U.S. military began adopting plans, reportedly
based on the January 2005 review conducted by Gen. Gary Luck, to shift up to
10,000 U.S. forces in Iraq from patrolling to embedding with Iraqi units.  
The FY2005 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 109-13) provides an additional
$5.7 billion to equip and train the ISF, funds to be controlled by the Department of
Defense and provided to MNSTC-I.  When spent, that would bring the total invested
on ISF to $11 billion.  The funds are slated for the various ISF as noted below. 
ISF Components.  The following, based on Administration  reports from May
2005,  are the status of the major Iraqi security institutions.58  
Ministry of Defense/Military Forces.  The following forces are considered
military forces, under the control of the Ministry of Defense. 
! Iraqi Army.  The CPA formally disbanded the former Iraqi army
following Bremer’s arrival in Baghdad; the outcome of that move is
still being debated.  About 97,700 of  both Army and National Guard
(see below), organized as nine infantry divisions and one
mechanized division, are reported as “operational” (all four
categories of readiness).  Of this force, about 25,000 might be
strictly Army (not National Guard).  New recruits are paid $60 per
month and receive eight weeks of training.  Of  FY2004 and FY2005
funds, $731 million is allocated for Iraqi Army facilities; $629
million is for equipment; and $429 million for training and
operations.
! Iraqi National Guard (ING).  This force, formerly called the Civil
Defense Corps, or ICDC, has now been made part of the “Army,”
although it is largely a  paramilitary force that mans checkpoints  and
assists in  combating insurgents.  This force may consist of about
75,000 of the broader  “Army”  total force cited above.  Recruits are
paid $50 per month and cannot have served in Iraq’s former army at
a level of colonel or higher.  They receive three weeks of training but
most of their training is “on-the-job,” patrolling alongside U.S.
forces.  Its members tends to be deployed in areas where they are
recruited.  Of FY2004 and FY2005 funds, $225 is allocated for ING
operations and personnel; $92 million is for its equipment; and $359
million is for its facilities construction.
! The Iraqi Intervention Force, another military force, is divided into
four brigades (perhaps about 3,000 personnel) trained and equipped.
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Recruits receive thirteen weeks of basic and urban operations
training.
! Special Operations Forces.  These forces consist of  “Iraqi Counter
Terrorist Forces” (ICTF) and a “Commando Battalion.”  The forces
are given 12 weeks of training, mostly by Jordanian officers in
Jordan.  The Defense Department says that there are 1,300 of these
forces as of October 2005.  
! In the fall of 2005, MNSTC-I formed four “Strategic Infrastructure
Battalions” (about 3,000 personnel) to protect oil pipelines,
electricity infrastructure, and other facilities. 
! Air Force.  It currently has about 200 personnel of its goal of 500,
manning four squadrons.  Because the Saddam-era air force was
destroyed in the various wars with the United States, the new Air
Force only flies nine helicopters, three C-130s, and 14 propeller
observation aircraft.  The UAE has said it would supply the Iraqi Air
Force with some additional unspecified combat aircraft, and Jordan
is considering providing 12 UH-1 helicopters.  About $28 million in
FY2004 funds was allocated for Iraqi Air Force airfields (of those
funds for the Iraqi Army, above).  Pilots undergo up to six months
of training.
! Navy.  This service has 700 operational personnel, roughly its target
size. It has a “Patrol Boat Squadron” and a “Coastal Defense
Regiment.”  It is equipped with five patrol boats, with six more to be
delivered, 24 Fast Aluminum Boats to patrol Iraq’s waterways (out
to the 12-mile international water boundary in the Persian Gulf) to
prevent smuggling and infiltration.  In March 2005, it took control
of its own naval base at Umm Qasr and, as of July 2005, U.S. Navy
personnel have turned over responsibility for Iraq’s Basrah port and
Khor Al Amaya oil terminals.  The Royal Australian Navy is
training some of the Iraqi navy personnel. 
! Military Training.59  U.S. training takes place at Taji, north of
Baghdad; Kirkush, near the Iranian border; and Numaniya, southeast
of Baghdad.  All 26 NATO countries are participating in the NATO
Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I),60 which open a new headquarters in
September 2005 at  Rustamiya, near Baghdad.  As of September
2005, 151 NATO trainers are in Iraq, according to NATO officials
in Baghdad, with the goal of 300 trainers eventually.  About 1,000
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Iraqi officers are to be trained there each year.  Additional Iraqi
officers are being  trained (under NTM-I) at NATO facilities in
Norway, Germany, and Italy.  Other countries performing training
under bilateral agreements are Jordan  (1,500 Iraqi officers trained
at Zarqa Military College), Egypt (146 officers), and Poland.  A
number of other countries, such as Spain, Turkey, France (police),
Malaysia, and Morocco, have offered military training, but the offers
were not responded to by Iraq.  On June 2, 2005, U.S. forces turned
over a military training base in  Kirkuk to Iraqi control.  
! Equipment.  Iraqi military forces are poorly equipped because much
of Iraq’s arsenal was destroyed in OIF.  The new military is being
supplied with U.S. and other donated equipment and some repaired
Iraqi equipment.  NATO countries from the former East bloc are
donating tanks and other mostly Russian-made equipment
compatible with the Soviet-era equipment used by the former
regime.  On November 21, 2003, the Bush Administration issued a
determination repealing a U.S. ban on arms exports to Iraq so that
the United States can supply weapons to the ISF; authority to repeal
this ban was granted in an FY2003 emergency supplemental
appropriations (P.L. 108-11), subject to a determination that sales to
Iraq are “in the national interest.”  On July 21, 2004, the
Administration determined that Iraq would be treated as a friendly
nation in evaluating U.S. arms sales to Iraqi security forces and that
such sales would be made in accordance with the Foreign Assistance
Act and the Arms Export Control Act.  
Ministry of Interior/Police Forces.  The following are police forces  under
the Ministry of Interior, which is advised by the Civilian Police Assistance Training
Team (CPATT).  However, many of these police forces are being trained to perform
counter-insurgency missions rather than traditional policing.  
 
! Iraqi Police Service (IPS).  There are 71,800 IPS personnel, divided
primarily into provincial police departments,  trained and equipped
thus far.  This number includes the 1,300 person Highway Patrol.
The goal of the police force is 135,000 by February 2007.  New
police receive eight weeks of training, are paid $60 per month, and
must pass a background check ensuring they do not have a record of
human rights violations or criminal activity. They are recruited
locally, making them susceptible to intimidation by insurgents in
restive areas.  Of  FY2004 and FY2005 funds, $1.808 billion has
been allocated for police training.
! Other Police Forces.  There are a number of other “police” forces,
focused on counter-insurgency missions.  They are (1) the Bureau of
Dignitary Protection, designed to protect Iraqi leaders, with about
500 personnel; (2) the Special Police Commandos, a counter-
insurgency unit with about 10,000 personnel.  It receives four weeks
of training; (3) the  Emergency Response Unit (ERU), a 300-person
hostage rescue force; the Mechanized Police, which has about 1,200
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personnel; and Public Order Police, with a total of about 7,000
personnel.  Civil Intervention Force Units get four-six weeks of
training. 
! Border Enforcement.  This force is also included in the  MOI forces.
Intended to prevent cross-border infiltration, it has about 17,000
personnel.  It also has a Riverine Police component to secure water
crossings (Shatt al-Arab, dividing Iran and Iraq).  Members of these
forces receive four weeks of training.  Of  FY2004 and FY2005
funds, $437 million is allocated for this force. 
! Police Training and Funding.  Police training is taking place mostly
in Jordan (Jordan International Police Training Center, JIPTC); Iraq
(Baghdad Police College and seven regional academies; and the
United Arab Emirates (UAE).  The countries contributing police
instructors in these locations include United States, Canada, Britain,
Australia, Sweden, Poland, UAE, Denmark, Austria, Finland, the
Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia, Singapore,
and Belgium.  Also, Egypt trained 258 officers in Egypt in August
2004.  Several countries, such as France and Belgium, as well as
most of the countries discussed above under “military training,”
have offered to train Iraqi police forces.61  
! Facilities Protection Service. This is a force that consists of the
approximately 75,000 security guards that protect installations such
as oil pumping stations, electricity substations, and government
buildings.  This force is not counted in U.S. totals for Iraq’s forces
because it is not controlled by either the Ministry of Interior or
Ministry of Defense.  Of FY2004 and FY2005 funds, $53 million
has been allocated for this service. 
Irregular and Militia Forces.  As noted earlier, many of the major political
factions maintain militia forces separate from the ISF.  The most prominent are
SCIRI’s Badr Brigades,  Kurds’ peshmerga, and Sadr’s Mahdi Army.  These forces
operate against insurgents and are sometimes accused of retaliating against Sunnis
suspected of supporting the  insurgents.  The New York Times reported on June 16,
2005, that Kurdish security elements have been imprisoning Arab suspected
insurgents in the Kurdish area, in contravention of Iraqi law.  In an example of militia
promotion of extra-legal activity, on August 9, 2005, Badr fighters reportedly helped
SCIRI member Hussein al-Tahaan forcibly replace Ali al-Tamimi as mayor of
Baghdad. 
Some militia members have joined the ISF  but retain loyalties to the parties or
figures that sponsored them rather than to the ISF command structure.  These recruits
reportedly are undisciplined and focus primarily on carrying out retaliatory attacks
against rival ethnicities and factions.  An example is the “Wolf Brigade” (discussed
above), which is an official component of the national police but is commanded by
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a Badr member.  During 2004, the United States and Iraq conducted some
“emergency recruitment” of former Saddam military units, mostly Sunni ex-
Baathists.  These units, one of which is led by Saddam-era Air Force intelligence
officer Adnan Thabit, have stiffened some security operations but have also provoked
threats by UIA and Kurdish leaders, who fear a future Ba’th coup,  
Coalition-Building and Maintenance62
Some Members believe that the Bush Administration did not exert sufficient
efforts to enlist greater international participation in peacekeeping and that, because
of the risk of casualties, the option of enlisting major new international force
contingents for Iraq is no longer available.  These Members and others believe that
coalition building was essential to reduce the financial and military burden of the
war.  (About 90% of coalition casualties in Iraq have been Americans.)  Coalition
countries are donating only about 15% of the total U.S.-led coalition contingent in
Iraq, and major potential force donors such as France and Germany refused to
contribute peacekeeping forces.
The Bush Administration asserts that the United States  has a substantial
coalition in Iraq, pointing to the fact that 29 other countries are providing about
23,000 peacekeeping forces.  However, perhaps because of international reluctance
to become involved in Iraq, the Administration is focusing on maintaining the
existing coalition rather than enlisting new donor forces.  Poland and Britain lead
multinational divisions  in central and southern Iraq, respectively.  The UK-led force
(UK forces alone number about 8,000) is based in Basra; the Poland-led force (Polish
forces number 1,700) is based in Hilla.  Japan has deployed about 600 troops to
Samawah, in southern Iraq, and South Korea has  3,500 troops in Kurdish Irbil.63  
Critics  point to the several withdrawal announcements since Spain’s May 2004
withdrawal of  its 1,300 troops as an indication that even the U.S. coalition-
maintenance effort is faltering.  Spain made that decision following the March 11,
2004 Madrid bombings and subsequent defeat of the former Spanish government that
had supported the war effort.  However, since the Iraqi election, Spain has said it
might train Iraqi security forces at a center outside Madrid.  Honduras, the
Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua followed Spain’s withdrawal (900 total
personnel), and the Philippines withdrew in July 2004 after one of its citizens was
taken hostage and threatened with beheading.  Among other recent changes:
! Hungary completed a pullout of its 300 forces in December 2004.
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! Italy announced on March 15, 2005, that it would begin withdrawing
its force of 3,200 in September 2005; the announcement came after
the U.S. wounding of an Italian journalist who was leaving Iraq after
being released by insurgents.  It reiterated the pullout commitment
in September 2005.
! Thailand, New Zealand, and Norway withdrew in early 2005, and
Norway’s 20 personnel left in Iraq will be withdrawn in October
2005.  
! In March 2005, Poland drew down to 1,700 from its prior force level
of 2,400.  Its president said in July 2005 that the remainder would be
withdrawn by February 2006 and replaced with a smaller contingent
to help train ISF.
! In March 2005, the Netherlands withdrew its 1,350 troops.  Some
U.K. forces have taken over the Netherlands force’s duty to help
protect Japan’s forces in Samawa.  After the January Iraqi  elections,
the Netherlands said it might send 100 trainers for the ISF.
! Ukraine, which lost eight of its soldiers in a January 2005  insurgent
attack, withdrew 150 personnel from their base 25 miles south of
Baghdad in March 2005. Ukraine says it will complete its
withdrawal probably by October 2005, but it adds that it might give
equipment to the Iraqi military.  
! In February 2004, Portugal withdrew its 127 paramilitary officers.
! On September 2, 2005, Bulgaria announced that it had begun pulling
out its 400-member unit, although in October 2005 it announced it
would postpone that pullout until after the December 15, 2005, Iraqi
elections.  It has said it would continue to contribute to NTM-I and
would increase its civilian reconstruction contingent in Iraq. 
! South Korea withdrew 270 of its almost 3,600 troops in June 2005.
! Japan, according to press reports in May 2005, is considering
withdrawing its 600 person military reconstruction contingent in
Samawah, by the end of 2005, and then focus instead on expanding
financial aid to Iraq.  Its forces are protected by Australian coalition
forces.  
! On the other hand, some countries have increased forces to
compensate for withdrawals.  Singapore deployed 180 troops in
November 2004 after a hiatus of several months, and Japan
approved extending its deployments at least through 2005.
Azerbaijan also has said it would increase forces. 
! In February 2005, El Salvador agreed to send a replacement
contingent of 380 soldiers to replace those who are rotating out.
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! In February 2005, Australia said it would send an additional 450
troops to Iraq, bringing that contribution to over 900. 
! In March 2005, Georgia sent an additional 550 troops to Iraq to help
guard the United Nations facilities, bringing its total Iraq deployment
to 850.  In March 2005, Albania said it would increase its force by
50, giving it a total of 120 troops in Iraq. 
NATO/EU/Other Offers of Civilian Training.  As noted above, all NATO
countries have now agreed to train the ISF through the NTM-I, as well as to
contribute funds or equipment.  Several NATO countries and others  are offering to
train not only Iraqi security but also civilian personnel.  In addition to the security
training offers discussed above, European Union (EU) leaders have offered to help
train Iraqi police, administrators, and judges outside Iraq.  At the June 22, 2005
Brussels conference discussed above, the EU pledged a $130 million package to help
Iraq write its permanent constitution and reform government ministries; Norway
offered energy sector cooperation, and Turkey offered to conduct seminars on
democracy for Iraqis.  Japan has made a similar offer on constitutional drafting, and
Malaysia has offered to train Iraqi civil servants.  The FY2005 supplemental
appropriations (P.L. 109-13) provides $99 million to set up a regional counter-
terrorism center in Jordan to train Iraqi security personnel and civil servants.
The  Administration asserts that it has consistently sought international  backing
for its post-war efforts, and it has supported an increase in the U.N. role since late
2003.  Resolution 1483 (May 6, 2003) provided for a U.N. special representative to
coordinate the U.N. activities in Iraq and it “call[ed] on” governments to contribute
forces for stabilization.  In a further attempt to satisfy the requirements of several
major  nations for greater U.N. backing, the United States obtained agreement on
Resolution 1511 (October 16, 2003, referenced above), formally authorizing a
“multinational force under unified [meaning U.S.] command.”  Resolution 1546
restated many of these provisions.  In July 2004, Secretary of State Powell said the
United States would consider a Saudi proposal for a contingent of troops from
Muslim countries to perform peacekeeping in Iraq, reportedly under separate
command.  However, the idea floundered because of opposition from potential
contributing countries.  
New Options
Some Members say that major new initiatives need to be considered to ensure
success of the U.S. mission in Iraq.  Some of the ideas widely circulated among
Members and other policy experts include the following. 
Troop Increase.  Some believe that the United States should increase its
troops in Iraq in an effort to prevent insurgents from re-infiltrating areas cleared by
U.S. operations.  Some experts believe the extra troops needed for such an effort
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might number about 100,000.64  The Administration asserts that U.S. commanders
feel they have enough force in Iraq to complete the mission, and that they are able to
request additional forces, if needed, and have not  done so.  Some experts believe that
troop level increases  would aggravate Sunni Arabs already resentful of the U.S.
intervention in Iraq and that even many more U.S. troops would not necessarily
produce stability.  Others believe that increasing U.S. force levels would further the
impression in Iraq that the Iraqi government is beholden to the United States for its
survival and that the United States is continuing to deepen its commitment to Iraq
without a clear exit strategy or victory plan.  
Troop Drawdown or Withdrawal.  Despite the assessments of the
insurgents’ continued strength, in March 2005, and then again on July 27, 2005, Gen.
Casey has said that there could be “fairly substantial reductions” in the number of
U.S. troops in Iraq by March 2006.65 However, he predicated such a reduction on
continued political progress and on the insurgency not escalating beyond current
levels.  Other senior U.S. defense officials, including Casey,  subsequently modified
or downplayed the possibility.  During a visit to Washington, D.C. in September
2005, Iraqi president Talabani first talked about the possibility of troop reductions in
2006 but then largely retracted that statement, saying no timetable should be set for
a U.S. pullout. 
Some Members argue that the United States should begin to withdraw
immediately and unconditionally, although gradually.  Those who take this position
include Representatives Lynne Woolsey, Maxine Waters, and Barbara Lee who,
together with about 47 other Members,  have initiated an “Out of Iraq Caucus.”
Supporters of this position tend to argue that the decision to invade Iraq and change
its regime was a mistake in light of the failure thus far to locate WMD and that a
continued large U.S. presence in Iraq will result in additional U.S. casualties without
securing U.S. national interests.  One bill (H.R. 3142) states that it is U.S. policy not
to maintain a permanent or long-term presence in Iraq.  Critics of the withdrawal
proposals, including the Bush Administration, say that an immediate U.S. pullout
would likely cause the Iraqi government to collapse, harming U.S. credibility and
permitting Iraq to become a haven for terrorists.  
Another version of this recommendation is the setting of a timetable to begin a
U.S. withdrawal.  This is exemplified by H.J.Res. 55, introduced by five House
Members from both parties, including Representative Walter Jones.  That bill calls
on the Administration to begin a withdrawal by October 2006.  It  has 58 co-sponsors
as of September 23, 2005.  Another version of this idea was a call by Senator Russ
Feingold in August 2005 to withdraw U.S. forces by the end of 2006, because setting
such a deadline would propel Iraq’s various factions to reconcile with each other.  He
has introduced a resolution (S.Res. 171) that calls for the Administration to report to
Congress on the time frame needed for the United States to complete its Iraq mission.
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The Administration and other Members assert that setting any timetable for
withdrawal would benefit the insurgency.  Some Members instead advocate the
stipulation of conditions that, if met, would permit a U.S. withdrawal.  An
amendment to the State Department authorization bill for FY2006 and FY2007 (H.R.
2601), adopted by a vote of 291-137, states the sense of Congress that the United
States should  withdraw only when U.S. national security and foreign policy goals
have been or are about to be achieved.
Power-Sharing Formulas.  The Administration and its critics appear to
agree that the dominant factions in Iraq need to cede more power to Sunni Arabs in
an effort to defuse the insurgency.  The Administration points to some progress in
this direction, particularly the participation of Sunnis in the October 15 referendum.
As noted above, U.S. Ambassador Khalilzad urged the Shiite and Kurdish factions
to fashion a constitution draft that could be acceptable to the Sunnis, although
apparently with only mixed success in that goal.  
The Administration appears to have adopted one recommendation of its critics
 — that there should be negotiations with Sunni figures representing the insurgency.
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld told journalists in late June 2005 that such
discussions have been taking place, although press reports say those talks have not
resulted in any insurgents laying down their arms, to date. 
Another power-sharing idea advanced by Ayatollah Sistani in June 2005 has
been adopted.  His aides suggested that the election method be altered to a district-
based system rather than the proportional representation system used in the January
2005 election.  A district-based election would likely ensure the election of a
substantial number of Sunnis to a new Assembly, because Sunnis would likely be
elected in Sunni districts no matter how low the Sunni turnout in that district.
Despite Kurdish opposition, the August 2005 election law provides that the
December 15, 2005, election will be based on province-by-province results, virtually
ensuring that more Sunnis will win seats than was the case in the January election.
Accelerating Economic Reconstruction.  Some believe that the key to
calming Iraq is to accelerate economic reconstruction.  According to this view,
accelerated reconstruction will drain support for insurgents by creating employment,
improving public services, and creating confidence in the government.  Others doubt
that economic improvement alone will produce major political results.  According
to this view, the divisions among Iraq’s major factions are fundamental and resistant
to amelioration by an improved economy.  
Focus on Local Security.  Some experts believe that the United States
should shift its focus from broad counter-insurgency combat operations to local
efforts to improve the sense of security of average Iraqis, which would deny the
insurgents popular support.66  At least one version of this idea, advanced by Andrew
Krepinevich in the September/October 2005 issue of Foreign Affairs,67  says that the
United States should devote substantial resources to providing security and
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reconstruction in selected areas, cultivating these areas as a model that would attract
support and be expanded to other areas and eventually throughout Iraq.
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Notes:  According to the U.S. Government  Accountability Office (Apr. 2004), the INC’s  Iraqi
National Congress Support Foundation (INCSF) received $32.65 million in U.S. Economic Support
Funds (ESF) in five agreements with the State Department during 2000-2003.  Most of the funds —
separate from drawdowns of U.S. military equipment and training under the “Iraq Liberation Act” —
were for the INC to run its offices in Washington, London, Tehran, Damascus, Prague, and Cairo, and
to operate its Al Mutamar (the “Conference”) newspaper and its “Liberty TV,” which began in August
2001, from London.  The station was funded by FY2001 ESF, with start-up costs of $1 million and
an estimated additional $2.7 million per year in operating costs.  Liberty TV was sporadic due to
funding disruptions resulting from the INC’s refusal to accept some State Department decisions on
how U.S. funds were to be used.  In August  2002, the State Department and Defense Department
agreed that the Defense Department would take over funding ($335,000 per month) for the INC’s
“Information Collection Program” to collect intelligence on Iraq; the State Department wanted to end
its funding of that program because of questions about the INC’s credibility and the propriety of its
use of U.S. funds.  The INC continued to receive these funds even after Saddam Hussein was
overthrown, but was halted after the June 2004 return of sovereignty to Iraq.  The figures above  do
not include covert aid provided — the amounts are not known from open sources.  Much of the “war
crimes” funding was used to translate and publicize documents retrieved from northern Iraq on Iraqi
human rights; the translations were placed on 176 CD-Rom disks.  During FY2001 and FY2002, the
Administration donated $4 million to a “U.N. War Crimes Commission” fund, to be used if a war
crimes tribunal is formed.  Those funds were drawn from U.S. contributions to U.N. programs.  See
General Accounting Office Report GAO-04-559, State Department: Issues Affecting Funding of Iraqi
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Figure 1.  Map of Iraq
